# 1AC

## 1AC – Plan

The United States federal government should substantially increase cooperative investment in land ports of entry with Mexico.

## 1AC – Manufacturing

The manufacturing sector is growing but it’s a question of sustainability

Curtin 12– Staff Writer for CNBC News and the Daily Ticker (Stacy, 10/17/12, “Manufacturing 'Recovery' Not All It's Cracked Up to Be?,” http://www.cnbc.com/id/49448048)

While proposals by both candidates aim to build a more robust manufacturing sector, those types of jobs account for only 9% of the total U.S. workforce. That number is likely to grow according to estimates by the Boston Consulting Group, which projects 5 million manufacturing and supporting jobs will return home over the next 10 years largely to due rising production and labor costs in emerging markets like China. But is this recovery in manufacturing sustainable? Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih do not believe it is. They joined The Daily Ticker's Aaron Task to discuss their new book "Producing Prosperity: Why America Needs a Manufacturing Renaissance" which underscores how important a strong manufacturing base is for American innovation. "I think we've seen obviously some shorter-term blips, if you will, in the last year or so," says Pisano. "They are good, but I would not get overly excited that that is suggesting some big structural long-term change." While there may be a slight uptick in the level of manufacturing jobs, the professors are quick to note that the type of jobs that left the U.S. are not the ones that are coming back. "They are low-skilled, lower wage jobs," Pisano says of the jobs that are returning. If wages are to grow, the nation needs to be involved in more sophisticated manufacturing that other countries cannot do.

Border congestion makes the relationship unsustainable — the plan boosts U.S. manufacturing and overall competitiveness

Wilson and Lee 11 (Christopher E. Wilson, is an Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs. He is the author of Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico (Christopher E. Wilson, Erik Lee, Site Selection, July 2012, “Whole Nations Waiting,” <http://www.siteselection.com/issues/2012/jul/us-mex-border.cfm>, Accessed 09-09-2013)

Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great — yet underappreciated — success stories of the global economy. In 2011 U.S.-Mexico goods and services trade reached the major milestone of one-half trillion dollars with virtually no recognition. The United States is Mexico's top trading partner, and Mexico — which has gained macroeconomic stability and expanded its middle class over the last two decades — is the United States' second largest export market and third largest trading partner. Seventy percent of bilateral commerce crosses the border via trucks, meaning the border region is literally where "the rubber hits the road" for bilateral relations. This also means that not only California and Baja California, but also Michigan and Michoacán, all have a major stake in efficient and secure border management. The quantity of U.S.-Mexico trade is impressive, but its quality makes it unique. The United States and Mexico do not just sell goods to one another, they actually work together to manufacture them. Through production sharing, materials and parts often cross back and forth between factories on each side of the border as a final product is made and assembled. As a result, U.S. imports from Mexico contain, on average, 40 percent U.S. content, and Mexico's imports from the U.S. also have a high level of Mexican content. This system of joint production has two important consequences. First, it means that our economies are profoundly linked. We tend to experience growth and recession together, and productivity gains or losses on one side of the border generally cause a corresponding gain or loss in competitiveness on the other side as well. Second, the fact that goods often cross the border several times as they are being produced creates a multiplier effect for gains and losses in border efficiency. Whereas goods from China only go through customs and inspection once as they enter the U.S. or Mexico, products built by regional manufacturers bear the costs of long and unpredictable border wait times and significant customs requirements each time they cross the U.S.-Mexico border. Corridors in Crisis This trade relationship requires major infrastructure to function effectively. The largest trade corridor, often referred to as the NASCO corridor, links central and eastern Mexico to Texas, the American Midwest, Northeast, and Ontario, utilizing the key Laredo-Nuevo Laredo ports of entry (POEs). Other important trade arteries include the CANAMEX Corridor, which connects western Mexico to the intermountain United States and Canadian province of Alberta, as well as the shorter but high-volume I-5 corridor connecting California to Baja California. As the economies of both the U.S. and Mexico grow, it is likely that this network of freight transportation infrastructure — and the land POEs that serve as nodes in this network — will experience added stress. Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of bilateral trade or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for greater border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly, long and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion acts as a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and Mexico in their entirety. Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security and efficiency at the same time. The integrated nature of the North American manufacturing sector makes eliminating border congestion an important way to enhance regional competitiveness. The global economic crisis forced manufacturers to look for ways to cut costs. After taking into consideration factors such as rising fuel costs, increasing wages in China and the ability to automate an ever greater portion of the production process, many American companies decided to nearshore factories to Mexico or reshore them to the United States, taking advantage of strong human capital and shorter supply chains. Bilateral trade dropped significantly during the recession but has since rebounded strongly, growing significantly faster than trade with China. But the growth of trade continues to add pressure on the already strained POEs and transportation corridors. Several studies have attempted to quantify the costs of border area congestion to the economies of the United States and Mexico. In what is perhaps a testimony to the fragmented and geographically disperse nature of the border region, most of these studies have focused on particular North-South corridors of traffic and trade rather than taking a comprehensive, border-wide approach. The specific results of the studies (see table on p. 108) are quite varied. Nonetheless, one message comes through quite clearly — long and unpredictable wait times at the POEs are costing the United States and Mexican economies many billions of dollars each year. Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry are certainly needed, as long lines and overworked staff promote neither efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, asking for more resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less, improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler and shipper programs (i.e. the Global Entry programs, which includes programs such as SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT) allow vetted, low-risk individuals and shipments expedited passage across the border. Common Voice Improving these programs and significantly expanding enrollment could increase throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure and staffing — all while strengthening security by giving border officials more time to focus on unknown and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments. The development of the 21st Century Border initiative by the Obama and Calderón administrations has yielded some advances in this direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled. The 1990s were the decade of NAFTA and skyrocketing trade. The 2000s saw security concerns grow and recession struck. The new decade has only just begun, but the potential is there for a resurgence of competitiveness and regional integration. There are strong ideas — including trusted traveler and shipper programs, preclearance, customs harmonization, and public-private partnerships — that have enormous potential.

Modernizing border infrastructure solves — safeguards competitiveness, bolsters manufacturing, and supports 6 million U.S. jobs

NAFTA Works 13 (a monthly newsletter on NAFTA and related issues (NAFTA Works, Volume 18, Issue 4, April 2013, “Border Infrastructure's Key Role in Expanding U.S.-Mexico Trade”, <http://www.naftamexico.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/apr13.pdf>, Accessed 07-21-2013 | AK)

Very few countries in the world have the potential to shape the United States’ manufacturing competitiveness as much as Mexico. It is difficult to overstate the critical importance of this strategic partnership, as trade between both countries reached roughly half a trillion dollars in 2012, maintaining Mexico’s status as the U.S.’ third largest trading partner and its second largest export market as it purchased nearly 1/8 of all U.S. exports. The increased usage of cross-border production lines has resulted in a very unique trading partnership, where working to establish a trade facilitating border infrastructure is now crucial to successfully competing in the global market. In order to understand the true strength of this partnership, a new approach that incorporates the relevance of foreign value-added in exports is required. Consequently, one of the most distinctive factors of U.S.-Mexico trade lies in its qualitative nature. Working together to co-manufacture products entails an intensive intra-industry trade of inputs rather than exclusively trading in finished products, helping to support the 6 million U.S. jobs that depend on trade with Mexico. As a result of this highly integrated production process, on average, 40% of all content in Mexican exports to the U.S. actually originates in the United States. As 82%, or $404 billion, of bilateral trade was carried across the border via surface transportation in 2012, improving the efficiency of trade flows at the U.S. southern Ports of Entry (POE) is imperative to safeguarding a regional competitive edge. Last year, over 44 million tons of food, inputs, components, and finished products crossed by land from Mexico into the U.S. to supply manufacturing plants and supermarkets alike. Far from exclusively benefiting the four Southern U.S. states bordering Mexico, a total of twenty-nine U.S. states had exports to Mexico in excess of $1 billion in 2012, making this one of the most economically significant borders in the world. Additionally, some twenty-three U.S. states depended on Mexico as their No. 1 and No. 2 largest export market in 2012, with states as far north as Michigan exporting over $10 billion. This illustrates that even states’ local economies that are far from the southern border are also major stakeholders when it comes to building a seamless, long haul border infrastructure that is capable of minimizing cross-border business costs. Of the 26 POEs along the southern border that collectively handled more than $1.3 billion in bilateral trade each day in 2012 - virtually all of it tariff free - the largest by far is the Port of Laredo in Texas. This critical POE facilitated more than 3.5 million cross-border commercial truck shipments, and over 500 thousand rail-boxes via railway in both directions, carrying more than $163 billion in goods in 2012 or 35% of all bilateral trade. Considering that forty U.S. states spread across the country use Laredo as their primary POE, this port could truly be considered the U.S.’ main artery for bilateral trade with Mexico. Last year alone, more than $76 billion in U.S. exports to Mexico and $86 billion in imported Mexican goods went through the Laredo POE. Another strategic POE is El Paso, which had 13% of all U.S.- Mexico trade pass through in 2012. With over $66 billion in goods being traded here, it is the second busiest port for bilateral trade. As an example of its relevance, El Paso is the second largest POE for U.S. electrical machinery exports to Mexico, as it was responsible for the timely crossing of 26% of this vital industry’s exports. Along the western side of the border, Otay Mesa is the U.S.’ third largest POE for bilateral trade with Mexico, which had more than $35 billion of goods move through this facility in 2012. An astonishing 99% of trade between California and Mexico is conducted by trucks, therefore ensuring that the state’s busiest commercial truck crossing operates at maximum efficiency is critically important. In order to enhance and also secure regional competitiveness, the strength of both countries’ industrial capabilities lies in the joint effort to minimize the logistical costs placed on regional manufactures. By expanding and modernizing the current border infrastructure, both countries promote a world-class logistical capability that improves border wait times, customs procedures, and trusted traveler or shipper programs. As a result, both countries are working together through the 21st Century Border Initiative to address shared challenges. Progress has been achieved over the past three years that has helped to facilitate the secure and efficient flow of goods and people along the border. Three new international bridges, one in Arizona and the other two in Texas, were constructed to support this growing demand. Becoming operational in 2009, the Anzalduas International Bridge in Texas was the first new bridge to be built in over a decade, during which bilateral trade grew by 76%.

It spills over – a strong manufacturing base is key to advanced manufacturing

Lind 12- Policy director of New America’s Economic Growth Program and a co-founder of the New America Foundation (Michael, “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing Future,” http://growth.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Lind,%20Michael%20and%20Freedman,%20Joshua%20-%20NAF%20-%20Value%20Added%20America%27s%20Manufacturing%20Future.pdf )

Manufacturing, R&D and the U.S. Innovation Ecosystem Perhaps the greatest contribution of manufacturing to the U.S. economy as a whole involves the disproportionate role of the manufacturing sector in R&D. The expansion in the global market for high-value-added services has allowed the U.S. to play to its strengths by expanding its trade surplus in services, many of them linked to manufacturing, including R&D, engineering, software production and finance. Of these services, by far the most important is R&D**.** The United States has long led the world in R&D. In 1981, U.S. gross domestic expenditure on R&D was more than three times as large as that of any other country in the world. And the U.S. still leads: in 2009, the most recent year for which there is available data, the United States spent more than 400 billion dollars. European countries spent just under 300 billion dollars combined, while China spent about 150 billion dollars.14 In the United States, private sector manufacturing is the largest source of R&D. The private sector itself accounts for 71 percent of total R&D in the United States, and although U.S. manufacturing accounts for only 11.7 percent of GDP in 2012, the manufacturing sector accounts for 70 percent of all R&D spending by the private sector in the U.S.15 And R&D and innovation are inextricably connected: a National Science Foundation survey found that 22 percent of manufacturers had introduced product innovations and the same percentage introduced process innovations in the period 2006-2008, while only 8 percent of nonmanufacturers reported innovations of either kind.16 Even as the manufacturing industry in the United States underwent major changes and suffered severe job losses during the last decade, R&D spending continued to follow a general upward growth path. A disproportionate share of workers involved in R&D are employed directly or indirectly by manufacturing companies; for example, the US manufacturing sector employs more than a third of U.S. engineers.17 This means that manufacturing provides much of the demand for the U.S. innovation ecosystem, supporting large numbers of scientists and engineers who might not find employment if R&D were offshored along with production. Why America Needs the Industrial Commons Manufacturing creates an industrial commons, which spurs growth in multiple sectors of the economy through linked industries. An “industrial commons” is a base of shared physical facilities and intangible knowledge shared by a number of firms. The term “commons” comes from communallyshared pastures or fields in premodern Britain. The industrial commons in particular in the manufacturing sector includes not only large companies but also small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which employ 41 percent of the American manufacturing workforce and account for 86 percent of all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. Suppliers of materials, component parts, tools, and more are all interconnected; most of the time, Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih point out, these linkages are geographic because of the ease of interaction and knowledge transfer between firms.18 Examples of industrial commons surrounding manufacturing are evident in the United States, including the I-85 corridor from Alabama to Virginia and upstate New York.19 Modern economic scholarship emphasizes the importance of geographic agglomeration effects and co-location synergies. 20 Manufacturers and researchers alike have long noted the symbiotic relationship that occurs when manufacturing and R&D are located near each other: the manufacturer benefits from the innovation, and the researchers are better positioned to understand where innovation can be found and to test new ideas. While some forms of knowledge can be easily recorded and transferred, much “know-how” in industry is tacit knowledge. This valuable tacit knowledge base can be damaged or destroyed by the erosion of geographic linkages, which in turn shrinks the pool of scientists and engineers in the national innovation ecosystem. If an advanced manufacturing core is not retained, then the economy stands to lose not only the manufacturing industry itself but also the geographic synergies of the industrial commons, including R&D. Some have warned that this is already the case: a growing share of R&D by U.S. multinational corporations is taking place outside of the United States.21 In particular, a number of large U.S. manufacturers have opened up or expanded R&D facilities in China over the last few years.22 Next Generation Manufacturing A dynamic manufacturing sector in the U.S. is as important as ever. But thanks to advanced manufacturing technology and technology-enabled integration of manufacturing and services, the very nature of manufacturing is changing, often in radical ways. What will the next generation of manufacturing look like? In 1942, the economist Joseph Schumpeter declared that “the process of creative destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.” By creative destruction, Schumpeter did not mean the rise and fall of firms competing in a technologically-static marketplace. He referred to a “process of industrial mutation— if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the new one.” He noted that “these revolutions are not strictly incessant; they occurred in discrete rushes that are separated from each other by spaces of comparative quiet. The process as a whole works incessantly, however, in the sense that there is always either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution.”23 As Schumpeter and others have observed, technological innovation tends to be clustered in bursts or waves, each dominated by one or a few transformative technologies that are sometimes called “general purpose technologies.” Among the most world-transforming general purpose technologies of recent centuries have been the steam engine, electricity, the internal combustion engine, and information technology.24 As epochal as these earlier technology-driven innovations in manufacturing processes and business models proved to be, they are rapidly being superseded by new technologydriven changes as part of the never-ending process of Schumpeterian industrial mutation. The latest wave of innovation in industrial technology has been termed “advanced manufacturing.” The National Science and Technology Council of the Executive Office of the President defines advanced manufacturing as “a family of activities that (a) depend on the use and coordination of information, automation, computation, software, sensing, and networking, and/or (b) make use of cutting edge materials and emerging capabilities enabled by the physical and biological sciences, for example, nanotechnology, chemistry, and biology. It involves both new ways to manufacture existing products and the manufacture of new products emerging from new advanced technologies.”25 Already computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) programs, combined with computer numerical control (CNC), allow precision manufacturing from complex designs, eliminating many wasteful trials and steps in finishing. CNC is now ubiquitous in the manufacturing sector and much of the employment growth occurring in the sector requires CNC skills or training. Information technology has allowed for enterprise resource planning (ERP) and other forms of enterprise software to connect parts of the production process (both between and within a firm), track systems, and limit waste when dealing with limited resources. Other areas in which advanced manufacturing will play a role in creating new products and sectors and changing current ones are: Supercomputing. America’s global leadership in technology depends in part on whether the U.S. can compete with Europe and Asia in the race to develop “exascale computing,” a massive augmentation of computer calculating power that has the potential to revolutionize predictive sci ences from meteorology to economics. According to the Advanced Scientific Computing Advisory Committee (ASCAC), “If the U.S. chooses to be a follower rather than a leader in exascale computing, we must be willing to cede leadership” in industries including aerospace, automobiles, energy, health care, novel material development, and information technology.26 Robotics: The long-delayed promise of robotics is coming closer to fulfillment. Google and other firms and research consortiums are testing robotic cars, and Nevada recently amended its laws to permit autonomous automobiles.27 Amazon is experimenting with the use of robots in its warehouses.28 Nanotechnology may permit manufacturing at extremely small scales including the molecular and atomic levels.29 Nanotechnology is also a key research component in the semiconductor indusmanutry, as government funding is sponsoring projects to create a “new switch” capable of supplanting current semiconductor technology.30 Photonics or optoelectronics, based on the conversion of information carried by electrons to photons and back, has potential applications in sectors as diverse as telecommunications, data storage, lighting and consumer electronics. Biomanufacturing is the use of biological processes or living organisms to create inorganic structures, as well as food, drugs and fuel. Researchers at MIT have genetically modified a virus that generates cobalt oxide nanowires for silicon chips.31 Innovative materials include artificial “metamaterials” with novel properties. Carbon nanotubes, for example, have a strength-to-weight ratio that no other material can match.32 Advanced manufacturing using these and other cuttingedge technologies is not only creating new products and new methods of production but is also transforming familiar products like automobiles. The rapid growth in electronic and software content in automobiles, in forms like GPS-based guidance systems, information and entertainment technology, anti-lock brakes and engine control systems, will continue. According to Ford, around 30 percent of the value of one of its automobiles is comprised by intellectual property, electronics and software. In the German automobile market, electronic content as a share of production costs is expected to rise from 20-30 percent in 2007 to 50 percent by 2020.33

Advanced manufacturing technology makes war obsolete – it’s the ultimate deterrent

Paone 9 **-** 66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs for the US Air Force (Chuck, 8-10-09, “Technology convergence could prevent war, futurist says,” http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123162500)

The convergence of "exponentially advancing technologies" will form a "super-intelligence" so formidable that it could avert war, according to one of the world's leading futurists. Dr. James Canton, CEO and chairman of the Institute for Global Futures, a San Francisco-based think tank, is author of the book "The Extreme Future" and an adviser to leading companies, the military and other government agencies. He is consistently listed among the world's leading speakers and has presented to diverse audiences around the globe. He will address the Air Force Command and Control Intelligence, Survelliance and Reconnaissance Symposium, which will be held Sept. 28 through 30 at the MGM Grand Hotel at Foxwoods in Ledyard, Conn., joining Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz and a bevy of other government and industry speakers. He offered a sneak preview of his symposium presentation and answered various questions about the future of technology and warfare in early August. "The superiority of convergent technologies will prevent war," Doctor Canton said, claiming their power would present an overwhelming deterrent to potential adversaries. While saying that the U.S. will build these super systems faster and better than other nations, he acknowledged that a new arms race is already under way. "It will be a new MAD for the 21st century," he said, referring to the Cold War-era acronym for Mutually Assured Destruction, the idea that a nuclear first strike would trigger an equally deadly response. It's commonly held that this knowledge has essentially prevented any rational state from launching a nuclear attack. Likewise, Doctor Canton said he believes rational nation states, considering this imminent technology explosion, will see the futility of nation-on-nation warfare in the near future. Plus there's the "socio-economic linking of the global market system." "The fundamental macroeconomics on the planet favor peace, security, capitalism and prosperity," he said. Doctor Canton projects that nations, including those not currently allied, will work together in using these smart technologies to prevent non-state actors from engaging in disruptive and deadly acts. As a futurist, Doctor Canton and his team study and predict many things, but their main area of expertise -- and the one in which he's personally most interested -- is advanced and emerging technology. "I see that as the key catalyst of strategic change on the planet, and it will be for the next 100 years," he said. He focuses on six specific technology areas: "nano, bio, IT, neuro, quantum and robotics;" those he expects to converge in so powerful a way. Within the information technology arena, Doctor Canton said systems must create "meaningful data," which can be validated and acted upon. "Knowledge engineering for the analyst and the warfighter is a critical competency that we need to get our arms around," he said. "Having an avalanche of data is not going to be helpful." Having the right data is. "There's no way for the human operator to look at an infinite number of data streams and extract meaning," he said. "The question then is: How do we augment the human user with advanced artificial intelligence, better software presentation and better visual frameworks, to create a system that is situationally aware and can provide decision options for the human operator, faster than the human being can?" He said he believes the answers can often be found already in what he calls 'edge cultures.' "I would look outside of the military. What are they doing in video games? What are they doing in healthcare? What about the financial industry?" Doctor Canton said he believes that more sophisticated artificial intelligence applications will transform business, warfare and life in general. Many of these are already embedded in systems or products, he says, even if people don't know it.

Manufacturing and defense capabilities control conflict-escalation — makes war obsolete.

O’Hanlon 12 — Michael O’Hanlon, is a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American foreign policy. He is a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. O’Hanlon is a member of the External Advisory Board at the Central Intelligence Agency (Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings, January 2012, “The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense Industrial Policy,” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon>, Accessed 09-18-2013)

The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as the U.S. defense industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past. Defense industrial issues are too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts. But the overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces utilize does have national security resonance. Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military technology has become an essential element of American military power in the modern era—not only for winning wars but for deterring them. That requires world-class scientific and manufacturing capabilities—which in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace.

Our heuristic is empirically verifiable — deterrence and incentive theory provide an accurate explanation of international relations.

Moore 4 — Director at the Center for Security Law at the University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential Appointee and Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law (John Norton Moore, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, pp. 27-31)

As so broadly conceived, there is strong evidence that deterrence, that is, the effect of external factors on the decision to go to war, is the missing link in the war/peace equation. In my War/Peace Seminar, I have undertaken to examine the level of deterrence before the principal wars of the twentieth century.10 This examination has led me to believe that in every case the potential aggressor made a rational calculation that the war would be won, and won promptly.11 In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through conventional attack seems to be the roughly six reeks predicted by the German General Staff as the time necessary ) prevail on the Western front in World War I under the Schlieffen Plan. Hitler believed in his attack on Poland that Britain and France could not take the occasion to go to war with him. And he believed his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union that “[w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."12 In contrast, following Hermann Goering's failure to obtain air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace. Calculations in the North Korean attack on South Korea and Hussein’s attack on Kuwait were that the operations would be completed in a matter of days. Indeed, virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century, at least those involving conventional invasion, were preceded by what I refer to as a "double deterrence absence." That is, the potential aggressor believed that they had the military force in place to prevail promptly and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic power to prevent this were not dined to intervene. This analysis has also shown that many of the perceptions we have about the origins of particular wars are flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the al historical record of British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the French or to so inform the Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World War I absence of effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the later robust NATO alliance and absence of World War III.14 Considerable other evidence seems to support this historical analysis as to the importance of deterrence. Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in 1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.15 In this book he conducts a detailed examination of the Peloponnesian War, World War I, Hannibal's War, and World War II, among other case studies. A careful reading of these studies suggests that each war could have been prevented by achievable deterrence and that each occurred in the absence of such deterrence.16 Game theory seems to offer yet further support for the proposition that appropriate deterrence can prevent war. For example, Robert Axelrod's famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, which is a reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy.17 Such a strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through incentives. Similarly, much of the game-theoretic work on crisis bargaining (and danger of asymmetric information) in relation to war and the democratic peace assumes the importance of deterrence through communication of incentives.18 The well-known correlation between war and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military achievability of aggression in many such settings. It should further be noted that the democratic peace is not the only significant correlation with respect to war and peace, although it seems to be the most robust. Professors Russett and Oneal, in recently exploring the other elements of the Kantian proposal for "Perpetual Peace," have also shown a strong and statistically significant correlation between economically important bilateral trade between two nations and a reduction in the risk of war between them. Contrary to the arguments of "dependency theorists," such economically important trade seems to reduce the risk of war regardless of the size relationship or asymmetry in the trade balance between the two states. In addition, there is a statistically significant association between economic openness generally and reduction in the risk of war, although this association is not as strong as the effect of an economically important bilateral trade relationship.° Russett and Oneal also show a modest independent correlation between reduction in the risk of war and higher levels of common membership in international organizations.20 And they show that a large imbalance of power between two states significantly lessens the risk of major war between them.21 All of these empirical findings about war also seem to directly reflect incentives; that is, a higher level of trade would, if foregone in war, impose higher costs in the aggregate than without such trade,22 though we know that not all wars terminate trade. Moreover, with respect to trade, a, classic study, Economic Interdependence and War, suggests that the historic record shows that it is not simply aggregate levels of bilateral trade that matters, but expectations as to the level of trade into the future.23 This directly implicates expectations of the war decision maker as does incentive theory, and it importantly adds to the general finding about trade and war that even with existing high levels of bilateral trade, changing expectations from trade sanctions or other factors affecting the flow of trade can directly affect incentives and influence for or against war. A large imbalance of power in a relationship rather obviously impacts deterrence and incentives. Similarly, one might incur higher costs with high levels of common membership in international organizations through foregoing some of the heightened benefits of such participation or otherwise being presented with different options through the actions or effects of such organizations. These external deterrence elements may also be yet another reason why democracies have a lower risk of war with one another. For their freer markets, trade, commerce, and international engagement may place them in a position where their generally higher level of interaction means that aggression will incur substantial opportunity costs. Thus, the "mechanism" of the democratic peace may be an aggregate of factors affecting incentives, both external as well as internal factors. Because of the underlying truth in the relationship between higher levels of trade and lower levels of war, it is not surprising that theorists throughout human history, including Baron de Montesquieu in 1748, Thomas Paine in 1792, John Stuart Mill in 1848, and, most recently, the founders of the European Union, have argued that increasing commerce and interactions among nations would end war. Though by themselves these arguments have been overoptimistic, it may well be that some level of "globalization" may make the costs of war and the gains of peace so high as to powerfully predispose to peace. Indeed, a 1989 book by John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday,24 postulates the obsolescence of major war between developed nations (at least those nations within the "first and second worlds") as they become increasingly conscious of the rising costs of war and the rising gains of peace. In assessing levels of democracy, there are indexes readily available, for example, the Polity III25 and Freedom House 26 indexes. I am unaware of any comparable index with respect to levels of deterrence that might be used to test the importance of deterrence in war avoidance?' Absent such an accepted index, discussion about the importance of deterrence is subject to the skeptical observation that one simply defines effective deterrence by whether a war did or did not occur. In order to begin to deal with this objection and encourage a more objective methodology for assessing deterrence, I encouraged a project to seek to develop a rough but objective measure of deterrence with a scale from minus ten to plus ten based on a large variety of contextual features that would be given relative weighting in a complex deterrence equation before applying the scaling to different war and nonwar settings.28 On the disincentive side of the scale, the methodology used a weighted calculation of local deterrence, including the chance to prevent a short- and intermediate-term military victory, and economic and political disincentives; extended deterrence with these same elements; and contextual communication and credibility multipliers. On the incentive side of the scale, the methodology also used a weighted calculation of perceived military, economic, and political benefits. The scales were then combined into an overall deterrence score, including, an estimate for any effect of prospect theory where applicable.2 This innovative first effort uniformly showed high deterrence scores in settings where war did not, in fact, occur. Deterring a Soviet first strike in the Cuban Missile Crisis produced a score of +8.5 and preventing a Soviet attack against NATO produced a score of +6. War settings, however, produced scores ranging from -2.29 (Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in the Gulf War), -2.18 (North Korea's decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War), -1.85 (Hitler's decision to invade Poland in World War II), -1.54 (North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords), -0.65 (Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo), +0.5 (the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor), +1.25 (the Austrian decision, egged on by Germany, to attack Serbia, which was the real beginning of World War I), to +1.75 (the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I). As a further effort at scaling and as a point of comparison, I undertook to simply provide an impressionistic rating based on my study of each pre-crisis setting. That produced high positive scores of +9 for both deterring a Soviet first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO's deterrence of a Warsaw Pact attack and even lower scores than the more objective effort in settings where wars had occurred. Thus, I scored North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords and the German decision to invade Poland at the beginning of World War II as -6; the North Korean/Stalin decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War as -5; the Iraqi decision to invade the State of Kuwait as -4; Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo and the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I as -2; and the Austrian decision to attack Serbia and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor as -1. Certainly even knowledgeable experts would be likely to differ in their impressionistic scores on such pre-crisis settings, and the effort at a more objective methodology for scoring deterrence leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, both exercises did seem to suggest that deterrence matters and that high levels of deterrence can prevent future war. Following up on this initial effort to produce a more objective measure of deterrence, two years later I encouraged another project to undertake the same effort, building on what had been learned in the first iteration. The result was a second project that developed a modified scoring system, also incorporating local deterrence, extended deterrence, and communication of intent and credibility multipliers on one side of a scale, and weighing these factors against a potential aggressor's overall subjective incentives for action on the other side of the scale.3° The result, with a potential range of -5.5 to +10, produced no score higher than +2.5 for eighteen major wars studied between 1939 and the 1990 Gulf War.31 Twelve of the eighteen wars produced a score of zero or below, with the 1950-53 Korean War at -3.94, the 1965-75 Vietnam War at -0.25, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War at -1.53, and the 1990-91 Gulf War at -3.83. The study concluded that in more than fifty years of conflict there was "no situation in which a regime elite/decision making body subjectively faced substantial disincentives to aggressive military action and yet attacked."32 Yet another piece of the puzzle, which may clarify the extent of deterrence necessary in certain settings, may also assist in building a broader hypothesis about war. In fact, it has been incorporated into the just-discussed efforts at scoring deterrence. That is, newer studies of human behavior from cognitive psychology are increasingly showing that certain perceptions of decision makers can influence the level of risk they may be willing to undertake, or otherwise affect their decisions.33 It now seems likely that a number of such insights about human behavior in decision making may be useful in considering and fashioning deterrence strategies. Perhaps of greatest relevance is the insight of "prospect theory," which posits that individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point and that they may be more risk averse in settings posing potential gain than in settings posing potential loss.34 The evidence of this "cognitive bias," whether in gambling, trading, or, as is increasingly being argued, foreign policy decisions generally, is significant. Because of the newness of efforts to apply a laboratory based "prospect theory" to the complex foreign policy process generally, and particularly ambiguities and uncertainties in framing such complex events, our consideration of it in the war/peace process should certainly be cautious. It does, however, seem to elucidate some of the case studies. In the war/peace setting, "prospect theory" suggests that deterrence may not need to be as strong to prevent aggressive action leading to perceived gain. For example, there is credible evidence that even an informal warning to Kaiser Wilhelm II from British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, if it had come early in the crisis before events had moved too far, might have averted World War I. And even a modicum of deterrence in Kuwait, as was provided by a small British contingent when Kuwait was earlier threatened by an irredentist Iraqi government in 1961, might have been sufficient to deter Saddam Hussein from his 1990 attack on Kuwait. Similarly, even a clear United States pledge for the defense of South Korea before the attack might have prevented the Korean War. Conversely, following the July 28 Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Serbia in World War I, the issue for Austria may have begun to be perceived as loss avoidance, thus requiring much higher levels of deterrence to avoid the resulting war. Similarly, the Rambouillet Agreement may have been perceived by Milosevic as risking loss of Kosovo and his continued rule of Serbia and, as a result, may have required higher levels of NA-TO deterrence to have prevented Milosevic's actions in defiance. Certainly NATO's previous hesitant responses in 1995 against Milosevic in the Bosnia phase of the Yugoslav crisis and in 1998-99 in early attempts to deal with Kosovo did not create a high level of deterrence.35 One can only surmise whether the killing in Kosovo could have been avoided had NATO taken a different tack, both structuring the issue less as loss avoidance for Milosevic and considerably enhancing deterrence. Suppose, for example, NATO had emphasized that it had no interest in intervening in Serbia's civil conflict with the KLA but that it would emphatically take action to punish massive "ethnic cleansing" and other humanitarian outrages, as had been practiced in Bosnia. And on the deterrence side, it made clear in advance the severity of any NATO bombardment, the potential for introduction of ground troops if necessary, that in any assault it would pursue a "Leadership Strategy" focused on targets of importance to Milosevic and his principal henchmen (including their hold on power), and that it would immediately, unlike as earlier in Bosnia, seek to generate war crime indictments of all top Serbian leaders implicated in any atrocities. The point here is not to second-guess NATO's actions in Kosovo but to suggest that taking into account potential "cognitive bias," such as "prospect theory," may be useful in fashioning effective deterrence. "Prospect theory" may also have relevance in predicting that it may be easier to deter (that is, lower levels are necessary) an aggression than to undo that aggression. Thus, much higher levels of deterrence were probably required to compel Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait than to prevent him initially from invading that state. In fact, not even the presence of a powerful Desert Storm military force and a Security Council Resolution directing him to leave caused Hussein to voluntarily withdraw. As this real-world example illustrates, there is considerable experimental evidence in "prospect theory" of an almost instant renormalization of reference point after a gain; that is, relatively quickly after Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, a withdrawal was framed as a loss setting, which he would take high risk to avoid. Indeed, we tend to think of such settings as settings of compellance, requiring higher levels of incentive to achieve compulsion producing an action, rather than deterrence needed for prevention. One should also be careful not to overstate the effect of "prospect theory" or to fail to assess a threat in its complete context. We should remember that a belated pledge of Great Britain to defend Poland before the Nazi attack did not deter Hitler, who believed under the circumstances that the British pledge would not be honored. It is also possible that the greater relative wealth of democracies, which have less to gain in all out war, is yet another internal factor contributing to the "democratic peace."36 In turn, this also supports the extraordinary tenacity and general record of success of democracies fighting in defensive settings as they may also have more to lose. In assessing adequacy of deterrence to prevent war, we might also want to consider whether extreme ideology, strongly at odds with reality, may be a factor requiring higher levels of deterrence for effectiveness. One example may be the extreme ideology of Pol Pot leading him to falsely believe that his Khmer Rouge forces could defeat Vietnam.37 He apparently acted on that belief in a series of border incursions against Vietnam that ultimately produced a losing war for him. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's 9/11 attack against America, hopelessly at odds with the reality of his defeating the Western World and producing for him a strategic disaster, seems to have been prompted by his extreme ideology rooted in a distorted concept of Islam at war with the enlightenment. The continuing suicide bombings against Israel, encouraged by radical rejectionists and leading to less and less for the Palestinians, may be another example. If extreme ideology is a factor to be considered in assessing levels of deterrence, it does not mean that deterrence is doomed to fail in such settings but only that it must be at higher levels (and properly targeted on the relevant decision elites behind the specific attacks) to be effective, as is also true in perceived loss or compellance settings.38 Even if major war in the modern world is predominantly a result of aggression by nondemocratic regimes, it does not mean that all nondemocracies pose a risk of war all, or even some, of the time. Salazar's Portugal did not commit aggression. Nor today do Singapore or Bahrain or countless other nondemocracies pose a threat. That is, today nondemocracy comes close to a necessary condition in generating the high risk behavior leading to major interstate war. But it is, by itself, not a sufficient condition for war. The many reasons for this, of course, include a plethora of internal factors, such as differences in leadership perspectives and values, size of military, and relative degree of the rule of law, as well as levels of external deterrence.39 But where an aggressive nondemocratic regime is present and poses a credible military threat, then it is the totality of external factors, that is, deterrence, that become crucial.

Additionally, border manufacturing is key to the aerospace and defense industry

Guidi 11 — was the Fronteras reporter at KPBS, covering immigration, border issues and culture. She’s a journalist and producer with experience working in radio, print, and multimedia, and has reported from the Caribbean, South and Central America, as well as the U.S.-Mexico border region, “Border Business: Aerospace As A Binational Industry,” <http://www.fronterasdesk.org/news/2011/sep/28/business-mexico-aerospace-industry-maquiladora>, Accessed 09-18-2013)

With its high-profile speakers and 3D simulation stations, the second annual Baja Aero Space Show did a pretty good job of putting the Mexican state of Baja California on the map — at least when it comes to aerospace manufacturing. “People’s perceptions about what cross-border manufacturing, what maquiladoras are like, is still based upon what was happening in the 70s and maybe the 80s,” said Kenn Morris, president of Crossborder Group, a San Diego-based market research firm. “The fact is that a lot of the factories, whether they produce medical devices, aerospace, or electronics; they are built in such a way these days, and they’re managed in such a way, that they can be put anywhere on the planet,” Morris said. “But they’re coming to Mexico.” According to Mexico’s Trade Ministry, more than 50 aerospace and defense companies have started operations in Baja in the last five to 10 years. Most of them are American and manufacture parts for companies like Honeywell, Goodrich and Gulfstream. They produce a wide variety of items, from electronic components, air conditioning systems, and cable harnesses, to steel bolts for commercial and military aircraft. Their advantage is the proximity to the United States and to Western ports that ship to the Asian markets. They have access to a large, high-tech workforce in Tijuana, made up of engineers, technicians and software developers. But the main reason the companies come to Baja is simple: The cost of that highly skilled labor is low — about one-third of what it is in the U.S. Currently, the Baja aerospace industry employs more than 10,000 machine operators and technicians. And that number has been growing steadily since 2007, when Mexico dropped import duties on aeronautics components. According to Mexico’s Trade Ministry, between 2007 and 2008, the amount of aerospace companies with operations in the Mexican border state grew by 50 percent.

That’s key to deter China and prevent war over Taiwan

Mosher 6 — Stephen Mosher, President and Director of the Population Research Institute, American social scientist who specializes in Chinese society and demography, an internationally recognized authority on China and population issues, as well as an acclaimed author, speaker, has appeared numerous times before Congress as an expert in world population, China, and human rights abuses. He has also made TV appearances on Good Morning America, 60 Minutes, The Today Show, 20/20, FOX and CNN news, as well as being a regular guest on talk radio shows across the nation, his articles have appeared in The Wall Street Journal, Reader’s Digest, The New Republic, The Washington Post, National Review, Reason, The Asian Wall Street Journal, Freedom Review, Linacre Quarterly, Catholic World Report, Human Life Review, First Things, and numerous other publications (Stephen Mosher, CQ Congressional Testimony, “Chinese Influence On U.S. Foreign Policy,” 02-14-2006, Lexis)

The ruthless mercantilism practiced by the CCP is thus a form of economic warfare. China's rulers seek to move as much of the world's manufacturing base to their country as possible, thus increasing the PRC's ''comprehensive national strength'' at the same time that it undermines U.S. national security by hollowing out America's industrial base in general and key defense-related sectors of the economy in particular. China will not lightly abandon this policy, which strengthens China as it weakens the U.S., and is an integral part of China's drive for Hegemony. Many of China's military modernization efforts—supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, stealthy submarines, theater based missiles with terminal guidance systems—are aimed specifically at U.S. forces and bases. By is acquiring weapons designed to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, the PRC is clearly preparing for a contest with the United States. Beijing is interested in deterring, delaying, or complicating U.S. assistance to Taiwan in the event of an invasion, so as to force a quick capitulation by the democratically elected Taiwan government. But while the near-term focus is Taiwan, many of China's new lethal capabilities are applicable to a wide range of potential operations beyond the Taiwan Strait. As the 2005 Report to Congress of the USCC report notes, ''China is in the midst of an extensive force modernization program aimed at increasing its force projection capabilities and confronting U.S. and allied forces in the region.''(see footnote 20) The rapid growth in China's military power not only threatens Taiwan—and by implication the U.S.—but U.S. allies throughout the Asian Pacific region. China possesses regional, even global ambitions, and is building a first-rate military to realize those ambitions. It is naive to view the PRC's military build-up as ''merely'' part of the preparations for an invasion of Taiwan in which American military assets in the Asian-Pacific will have to be neutralized.

Taiwan conflict triggers miscalculation — escalates to nuclear war

Lowther 13 — William Lowther, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (William Lowther, 03-16-2013, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211>)

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes. “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense. “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.” Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says. “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says. Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.” The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

However, a strong aerospace industry maintains deterrence — prevents Chinese aggression

Dunlap 6 — Charles, Major General, Deputy Judge Advocate of the Air Force, National War College graduate with over 30 years of Armed Forces experience (Charles Dunlap Jr., Armed Forces Journal, “America’s Asymmetric Advantage,” <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2009013>)

America's pre-eminence in air power is also the best hope we have to dissuade China — or any other future peer competitor — from aggression. There is zero possibility that the U.S. can build land forces of the size that would be of real concern to a China. No number of troops or up-armored Humvees, new radios or advanced sniper rifles worries the Chinese. What dominating air power precludes is the ability to concentrate and project forces, necessary elements to applying combat power in hostile areas. As but one illustration, think China and Taiwan. Saddam might have underestimated air power, but don't count on the Chinese to make the same mistake. China is a powerful, vast country with an exploding, many-faceted economy with strong scientific capabilities. It will take focused and determined efforts for the U.S. to maintain the air dominance that it currently enjoys over China and that, for the moment, deters them. Miscalculating here will be disastrous because, unlike with any counterinsurgency situation (Iraq included), the very existence of the U.S. is at risk.

## 1AC – Relations

Bilateral initiatives like the plan are key to solve relations – its on the brink now

O’Neil 13 Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “U.S. Exports Depend on Mexico ” Latin America’s Moment January 11 <http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/01/11/u-s-exports-depend-on-mexico/>

Hidden behind the troubling headlines, however, is another, more hopeful Mexico — one undergoing rapid and widespread social, political, and economic transformation. Yes, Mexico continues to struggle with grave security threats, but it is also fostering a globally competitive marketplace, a growing middle class, and an increasingly influential pro-democracy voter base. In addition, Mexico’s ties with the United States are changing. Common interests in energy, manufacturing, and security, as well as an overlapping community formed by millions of binational families, have made Mexico’s path forward increasingly important to its northern neighbor. For most of the past century, U.S.-Mexican relations were conducted at arm’s length. That began to change, however, in the 1980s and, even more, after the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) spurred greater bilateral economic engagement and cooperation. Mexico’s democratic transition has further eased the wariness of some skeptics in Washington. Still, the U.S.-Mexican relationship is far from perfect. New bilateral policies are required, especially to facilitate the movement of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexican border. More important, the United States needs to start seeing Mexico as a partner instead of a problem.

Infrastructure investment rebalances the relationship — overcomes alternate causalities

Selee and Wilson 12 — Andrew Selee, former Visiting Professor at El Colegio de Mexico, holds a Ph.D. in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland Vice President for Programs and Senior Adviser for the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Adjunct Professor of Government at Johns Hopkins University and of International Affairs at George Washington University, an M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California-San Diego, and a B.A. in Latin American Studies from Washington University in St. Louis, and Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, previously served as a Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and as a researcher at American University’s Center for North American Studies, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University, 2012 (“Getting ready for a new era in U.S.-Mexico ties,” Global Public Square—Fareed Zakaria’s CNN blog, December 3rd, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/03/Getting-Ready-for-a-New-Era-in-U-S-Mexico-Ties/)

U.S.-Mexico relations have been dominated for the past six years by efforts to address drug trafficking and organized crime-related violence. This was the right thing to do while violence spiked in Mexico, but with a new administration in office after the swearing in of President Enrique Peña Nieto over the weekend, the time has come to re-balance the bilateral relationship. Ties tend to have the same top three items on the agenda year after year and administration after administration: immigration; drugs and violence; and trade and economic relations. Drugs and violence have dominated in recent years, and cooperation in addressing the transnational flows of drugs, arms and illicit money, as well as support for Mexico’s efforts to strengthen public security, must continue. Although the gains are still tenuous and the situation fluid, violence in Mexico does appear to have begun to decline at a national level and major advances have been made in key border cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez. Immigration dominated the early 2000's as presidents Bush and Fox sought a bilateral deal on the topic, but it has since become clear that immigration reform is first and foremost a domestic political issue in the United States. The rate of unauthorized immigration from Mexico has now dropped to historically low levels – there are at least as many leaving as arriving – which should allow for a more rational and reasoned debate on this issue in the United States. However, not since the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA in the 1990s have economic relations topped the bilateral agenda. Trade and jobs should once again top the U.S. agenda with Mexico for three main reasons. First, the economy most likely will be the top issue in both the United States and Mexico for the next several years. Economic issues were clearly the top issue for voters in the recent U.S. presidential elections, and in Mexico they matched public security as the top set of concerns. Second, by focusing on the creation of jobs and improving the competitiveness of manufacturers on both sides of the border, we can improve the tone of the relationship. We may even find that the stickier issues of security and migration become a little less intractable. Finally, the economic agenda between the two countries has the potential to yield tangible results, creating jobs and improving the competitive position of North America vis-a-vis Asia. For years, Mexico has oriented its economy toward the U.S. in hopes of harnessing the growth of the world’s most dynamic economy. Now, at a time when Mexico is growing around four percent a year – faster than the United States – Mexico can return the favor and provide a boost to the U.S. economy. Meanwhile, Mexico’s large and growing middle class has become an increasingly important market for U.S. products. As it turns out, U.S. and Mexican companies do not simply sell products to one another, they build products together, with parts zigzagging back and forth across the border as goods are manufactured. As a result, a product imported from Mexico is, on average, made of 40 percent U.S. parts and materials, meaning forty cents of every dollar spent of Mexican imports stays right here in the United States. Chinese products, in contrast, contain just four percent U.S. content. This also means the competitiveness of our two countries is closely linked, and improvements in productivity in one nation make a co-manufactured product cheaper and more competitive on the global market. That is to say, growth in Mexico or the United States will boost exports from both countries: when it comes to manufacturing, we are in it together. To produce results, the U.S.-Mexico economic agenda needs substance, and there is plenty to do. To start out, we must make the southwest border more efficient without sacrificing security. Today, long and unpredictable wait times act as a type of border tax, cutting away at manufacturers’ competitiveness a bit more each time they send goods across the border. Since we manufacture and export together, the United States should also join forces with Mexico and Canada in designing and implementing a global trade strategy. The first step is robust cooperation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, but the end goal must be to expand the agreement until countries like China and India feel they will lose out if they do not join in. The countries could also tackle ways of making customs procedures more efficient, ensuring regulatory frameworks are compatible, and integrating our transportation and logistics networks to keep up with regional manufacturers, who have already integrated production. In the end, it is a matter of perspective. If Mexico is seen more as a business partner than a source of intractable problems, a whole range of policy options that were previously considered too risky to be tried will be within reach. If such a change in perception occurs, the results will speak for themselves.

Plan is reverse-causal – flashpoints of border disagreement make future collapse inevitable

Baker Institute 9 — The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University—a nonpartisan public policy think tank, 2009 (“Developing the U.S.-Mexico Border Region for a Prosperous and Secure Relationship,” Baker Institute Policy Report, Number 38, April, Available Online at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/LAI-pub-BorderSecPREnglish-041509.pdf)

The relationship between the United States and Mexico has historically been a strong one, but internal politics in both countries today are preventing a potentially closer and more productive alliance. Problems at the border loom large in the political calculation of decision makers both in Washington, D.C., and Mexico City. Daily news reports seem to imply that problems developing at the border stand to derail common goals. However, it is our contention that the exact opposite is true. Creative localized solutions to the challenging set of issues that surround the U.S.–Mexico border could hold the key to building a stronger overall bilateral partnership and constructive joint future, rather than serve as the flashpoint for tensions between the two neighbors. Both Mexican President Felipe Calderón and U.S. President Barack Obama have a unique opportunity in the next four years to advance common goals such as economic prosperity and security. This report on the U.S.–Mexico border aims to aid policymakers in forging stronger and sustainable U.S.–Mexico bilateral relations with the use of more coordinated approaches to border issues. Sponsored by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston, Texas, this study investigates the important role of border institutions, civil society, cross-border transnational populations, and localized, small-scale problem-solving as a first defense against the deteriorating conditions at the border—be they humanitarian, economic, or security-related. By better understanding life along each side of the U.S.–Mexico border, we hope to demonstrate the great potential of this vibrant region to play a positive role in both the U.S. and Mexican economies and intertwined transnational communities. Rather than represent a zero-sum unilateral dilemma, the border can be a stepping stone toward a lasting friendship between the United States and Mexico, and positively influence citizens on both sides of the boundary. The border should be where one can best see the benefits for the two countries of collaborating and cooperating on issues of major concern. Instead, the border is increasingly becoming an area of tension, conflict, and unilateral policies and actions that are more likely to hinder, rather than promote, common goals.

Two internal links to terrorism

1. Method cooperation — response and communication

Rosales et al 11- MD has worked in the health arena for more than 20 years and in public health over 15 years, after serving five years as Director, Office of Border Health for the Arizona Department of Health Services. Dr. Rosales has expertise in program development and implementation, public health administration, policy and health disparities research in the Southwest, (Cecilia, “U.S.Mexico cross-border workforce training needs:survey implementation”, January 2011, Journal of Injury and Violence Research at Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3134923/>,)

Abinational border-wide, online assessment on preparedness/emergency response and workforce training needs of personnel dedicated to the U.S.-Mexico border region was ommissioned by the ten U.S.-Mexico border state health offices through the U.S.-Mexico Border Governor’s Conference. The overarching goal of the study was to provide the Border States with information that could serve to orient, train, and evaluate the workforce charged with public health emergency preparedness and response as well as future preparedness personnel. The primary objective of the study was to assess and prioritize bioterrorism, infectious disease, and border training needs critical for responding to intentional and unintentional emergencies along the border region. The study was to describe the characteristics, learning preferences, proficiency and educational needs of the emergency preparedness and response workforce operating in the counties located in the U.S. border area. This area was defined by the La Paz Agreement and Public Law 103-400 (U.S. – Mexico Border Health Commission) as 100 kilometers north and south of the international boundary. The relative lack of literature addressing U.S.-Mexico cross-border issues related to emergency preparedness and bioterrorism highlights the importance of this assessment. This study describes and provides results of the assessment conducted with the four U.S. Border States and two Mexico Border States. While the study was mandated for all ten states funding was only provided for border cities within six states. Funding of transborder studies has been challenging for researchers focused on border health issues. The state of Sonora, sister state to Arizona, and the state of Chihuahua, sister state to Texas, were both successful in securing the resources to survey the preparedness and response workforce.

2. LPOE protection prevents infiltration – it’s a hotspot of cooperation

Mariclaire Acosta et al 12 – Project Director, Freedom House – Mexico Bill Bratton Chairman, Kroll Advisory Solutions, former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department and former New York City Police Commissioner Geoffrey Cowan President, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands John Engler President, Business Roundtable, former Governor of Michigan Rafael Fernández de Castro Chair, Department of International Studies, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, former Foreign Policy Advisor to President Calderón Michael Govan CEO and Wallis Annenberg Director, Los Angeles County Museum of Art Jane Harman Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center, former Member of Congress Carlos Heredia Director of International Studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE, former Member of Congress Phil Heymann James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, former Deputy Attorney General Barry Jackson Chief of Staff to the Speaker of the House John Boehner Enrique Krauze Historian and Essayist, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Letras Libres Isaac Lee President, News, Univision Communications Inc. Emilio Lozoya Chairman, JFH Lozoya Investments Mel Martinez Chairman, Florida, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean for JPMorgan Chase & Co., Chairman, JPMorgan Chase Foundation Doris Meissner Senior Fellow, Migration Policy Institute, former Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, (“Policy Recommendations for U.S.-Mexico Relations”, <http://sunnylands.org/files/posts/159/stronger_f.pdf>, AW)

At the same time, the United States faces a major challenge in ensuring the safety of its citizens against terrorist attacks, and it depends significantly on intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation from its two neighbors, Mexico and Canada. Indeed, this cooperation has been one of the untold stories of engagement between U.S. and Mexican federal agencies over the past decade, with the result that the U.S.-Mexico border has not yet been used for terrorist activities. However, continued vigilance and more sophisticated forms of cooperation will be needed to avoid the evolving threats from terrorist organizations. Policy oPtion: Develop border ports of entry that ensure safety and strengthen trade by employing risk-management techniques and the latest technology. Indeed, one of the greatest opportunities for binational cooperation on security, which would help address both Mexican concerns about transnational organized crime and U.S. concerns about terrorism, would be to develop more sophisticated approaches to managing ports of entry at the border. By using risk management techniques and the latest technology, the two countries could develop more effective ways of detecting potential threats, ranging from drugs to firearms to bombs, and simultaneously facilitate commerce and the exchange of people across the border. While much attention has been focused on beefing up security between ports of entry, the reality is that most of the real threats to the two countries are at the ports of entry rather than between them. A new focus on these could be a win-win for both countries and for both security and trade. Cooperation on Global Issues and Foreign Policy For the United States, Mexico is a key partner in international affairs. Mexico works hard to protect the United States from terrorist threats and to weaken transnational organized crime groups. It is a middle income country, currently holds the presidency of the G-20, and is expected to grow steadily for many years to come. Jim O’Neil of Goldman Sachs, for example, expects Mexico to have the seventh largest economy in the world by 2020. Mexico has long served as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds, and the U.S. can take advantage of this fact by working closely with Mexico on issues of common interest.

Border is a key area for counter-terrorism – here are 7518 reasons

Murdock 4/25, Deroy Murdock, Media Fellow of The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, nationally syndicated columnist with the Scripps Howard News Service, 4/25/13, (“The Southern Border: Our Welcome Mat for Terrorists”, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/346591/southern-border-our-welcome-mat-terrorists>, AW)

There are at least 7,518 reasons to get the U.S./Mexican border under control. That equals the number of aliens apprehended in fiscal year 2011 from the four nations the U.S. government labels “state sponsors of terrorism” and ten additional “countries of interest.” Since January 2010, those flying into America via these 14 nations face enhanced screening; as the Transportation Security Administration announced, “Effective aviation security must begin beyond our borders.” U.S. national security merits at least that much vigilance on our borders.

The roaring immigration-reform debate this year largely addresses Hispanic aliens who illegally cross the border. Far more worrisome, however, are the thousands who break into America from countries “where we have concerns, particularly about al-Qaeda affiliates,” a top State Department official told CNN.

These include Cubans, Iranians, Sudanese, and Syrians whose governments are federally designated “state sponsors of terrorism.” As indicated by the latest information in Table 34 of Customs and Border Protection’s Immigration Yearbook 2011, 198 Sudanese were nabbed while penetrating the USA. Between FY 2002 and 2011, there were 1,207 such arrests. (These figures cover all U.S. borders, although, as Table 35 confirms, 96.3 percent of the overall detainee population intruded from Mexico.) Like other immigrants, most Sudanese seek better lives here. But some may be vectors for the same militant Islam that literally tore Sudan in two.

In FY 2011, 108 Syrians were stopped at our borders; over ten years, the number is 1,353. Syria is a key supporter of Hezbollah, and Bashar Assad’s unstable regime reportedly has attacked its domestic opponents with chemical weapons.

As for Iranians, 276 were caught in FY 2011, while 2,310 were captured over the previous ten years. Iran also backs Hezbollah, hates “the Great Satan,” and craves atomic weapons.

The other ten “countries of interest” are Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and:

Afghanistan: The Taliban’s stronghold and current theater of America’s longest war. Afghans halted in FY 2011: 106. Prior ten fiscal years: 681.

Nigeria: The land of underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab suffers under sharia law in its northern provinces. Respective data: 591, 4,525.

Pakistan: Hideaway of the Pakistani Taliban and the late Osama bin Laden. 525, 10,682.

Saudi Arabia: Generous benefactor of radical imams and militant mosques worldwide; birthplace of 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers. 123, 986.

Somalia: Home of Indian Ocean pirates and al-Qaeda’s al-Shabaab franchise. In October 1993, Islamic terrorists there shot down two Black Hawk helicopters, killed 18 U.S. soldiers, and dragged several of their bodies through Mogadishu’s streets. 323, 1,524.

At a Capitol Hill hearing last July, Homeland Security secretary Janet Napolitano conceded that terrorists enter the U.S. via the U.S./Mexican border “from time to time.”

The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight last November published A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence, and Terror at the Southwest Border. As this study explained:

The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected.

A Line in the Sand offers chilling portraits of some who treat the southern border as America’s welcome mat.

• On January 11, 2011, U.S. agents discovered Said Jaziri in a car trunk trying to enter near San Diego. Said said that he had traveled from his native Tunisia to Tijuana and paid smugglers $5,000 to sneak him across the border. The French government previously convicted and deported Jaziri for assaulting a Muslim whom he considered insufficiently devout. In 2006, Jaziri advocated killing Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard for creating what Jaziri called sacrilegious drawings of the Prophet Mohammed.

• Somalia’s Ahmed Muhammed Dhakane told authorities in 2011 that he earned up to $75,000 per day smuggling East Africans into America. His clients included three al-Shabaab terrorists. As the House report states: “Dhakane cautioned that each of these individuals is ready to die for their cause and would fight against the United States if the jihad moved from overseas to the U.S. mainland.”

• On June 4, 2010, Anthony Joseph Tracy (a.k.a. Yusuf Noor) was convicted of conspiring to slip aliens into America. Tracy told federal investigators that Cuban diplomats used his travel agency in Kenya — Noor Services Ltd. — to transfer 272 Somalis to Havana. They proceeded to Belize, through Mexico, and then trespassed into the U.S. Tracy, who converted to Islam in prison in the 1990s, claims he refused to assist al-Shabaab. But officials discovered an e-mail in which he casually wrote: “i helped a lot of Somalis and most are good but there are some who are bad and i leave them to ALLAH . . . ”

High risk – no tech barriers

Kenneth C. **Brill 12**, is a former U.S. ambassador to the I.A.E.A. Kenneth N. Luongo is president of the Partnership for Global Security. Both are members of the Fissile Material Working Group, a nonpartisan nongovernmental organization. Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger, www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?\_r=0

Terrorists exploit gaps in security. The current global regime for protecting the nuclear materials that terrorists desire for their ultimate weapon is far from seamless. It is based largely on unaccountable, voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across borders. Its weak links make it **dangerous** and inadequate to prevent nuclear terrorism**.** Later this month in Seoul, the more than 50 world leaders who will gather for the second Nuclear Security Summit need to seize the opportunity to start developing an accountable regime to prevent nuclear terrorism. There is a **consensus** among international leaders that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, not a Hollywood confection. President Obama, the leaders of 46 other nations, the heads of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and numerous experts have called nuclear terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and stability. It is also **preventable with more aggressive action**. At least four terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, have demonstrated interest in using a nuclear device. These groups operate in or near states with histories of questionable nuclear security practices. Terrorists do not need to steal a nuclear weapon. It is quite possible to make an improvised nuclear device from highly enriched uranium or plutonium being used for civilian purposes. And there is a black market in such material. There have been 18 confirmed thefts or loss of weapons-usable nuclear material. In 2011, the Moldovan police broke up part of a smuggling ring attempting to sell highly enriched uranium; one member is thought to remain at large with a kilogram of this material.

Biological terrorist attack causes extinction

Kellman ‘08[Barry, Director of the International Weapons Control Center at the DePaul University College of Law and author of Bioviolence—Preventing Biological Terror and Crime; “Bioviolence: A Growing Threat,” The Futurist, May-June 2008, http://www.wfs.org/March-April09/MJ2008\_Kellman.pdf]

What Might Bioviolence Accomplish? Envision a series of attacks against capitals of developing states that have close diplomatic linkages with the United States. The attacks would carry a well-publicized yet simple warning: “If you are a friend of the United States, receive its officials, or support its policies, thousands of your people will get sick.” How many attacks in how many cities would it take before international diplomacy, to say nothing of international transit, comes to a crashing halt? In comparison to use of conventional or chemical weapons, the potential death toll of a bioattack could be huge. Although the number of victims would depend on where an attack takes place, the type of pathogen, and the sophistication of the weapons maker, there is widespread consensus among experts that a heightened attack would inflict casualties exceedable only by nuclear weapons. In comparison to nuclear weapons, bioweapons are far easier and cheaper to make and transport, and they can be made in facilities that are far more difficult to detect. The truly unique characteristic of certain bioweapons that distinguishes them from every other type of weapon is contagion. No other type of weapon can replicate itself and spread. Any other type of attack, no matter how severe, occurs at a certain moment in time at an identifiable place. If you aren’t there, you are angry and upset but not physically injured by the attack. An attack with a contagious agent can uniquely spread, potentially imperiling target populations far from where the agents are released. A bio-offender could infect his minions with a disease and send them across borders before symptoms are obvious. Carriers will then spread it to other unsuspecting victims who would themselves become extended bioweapons, carrying the disease indiscriminately. There are challenges in executing such an attack, but fanatical terrorist organizations seem to have an endless supply of willing suicide attackers. All this leads to the most important characteristic of bioviolence: It raises incomparable levels of panic. Contagious bioviolence means that planes fly empty or perhaps don’t fly at all. People cancel vacation and travel plans and refuse to interact with each other for fear of unseen affliction. Public entertainment events are canceled; even going to a movie becomes too dangerous. Ultimately, bioviolence is about hiding our children as everyone becomes vulnerable to our most fundamental terror: the fear of disease. For people who seek to rattle the pillars of modern civilization and perhaps cause it to collapse, effective use of disease would set in motion political, economic, and health consequences so severe as to call into question the ability of existing governments to maintain their citizens’ security. In an attack’s wake, no one would know when it is over, and no government could credibly tell an anxious population where and when it is safe to resume normal life. While it is difficult to specify when this danger will strike, there should be no doubt that we are vulnerable to a rupture. Just as planes flying into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, instantly became a historical marker dividing strategic perspectives before from after, the day that disease is effectively used as an instrument of hate will profoundly change everything. If you want to stop modern civilization in its tracks, bioviolence is the way to go. The notion that no one will ever commit catastrophic bioviolence is simply untenable.

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction –escalates to Russia and China

Ayson 10 – Robert Ayson 10, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible thatsome sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors**.** Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhapsIran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan**.** But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism(as discussed earlier)Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

## 1AC – Trade

Efficient border key to trade competitiveness

US COC 11 (Steps to a 21st Century US Mexico Border, [www.uschamber.com/sites/.../2011\_us\_mexico\_report.pdf](http://www.uschamber.com/sites/.../2011_us_mexico_report.pdf) ) rss

Key U.S. industries share a symbiotic role with counterpart Mexican industries. Our supply chains criss-cross the border throughout the manufacturing process. This makes both our economies more resilient and more competitive in global markets. President Obama has championed a National Export Initiative

(NEI) with the goal of doubling U.S. exports over the next five years. We wholeheartedly endorse and support that goal. With Mexico purchasing 13% of all U.S. exports last year, it is clear that an efficient shared border is critical to reaching the president’s goal.

Improved transportation solves trade competition

Wilson and Lee 2012 (Christopher E. Wilson is an Associate at the Wilson Center's Mexico Institute. Erik Lee serves as Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University, July, <http://www.siteselection.com/issues/2012/jul/us-mex-border.cfm>) rss

This trade relationship requires major infrastructure to function effectively. The largest trade corridor, often referred to as the NASCO corridor, links central and eastern Mexico to Texas, the American Midwest, Northeast, and Ontario, utilizing the key Laredo-Nuevo Laredo ports of entry (POEs). Other important trade arteries include the CANAMEX Corridor, which connects western Mexico to the intermountain United States and Canadian province of Alberta, as well as the shorter but high-volume I-5 corridor connecting California to Baja California. As the economies of both the U.S. and Mexico grow, it is likely that this network of freight transportation infrastructure — and the land POEs that serve as nodes in this network — will experience added stress. Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of bilateral trade or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for greater border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly, long and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion acts as a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and Mexico in their entirety. Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security and efficiency at the same time.

Congestion limits benefits of trade

US COC 11 (Steps to a 21st Century US Mexico Border, [www.uschamber.com/sites/.../2011\_us\_mexico\_report.pdf](http://www.uschamber.com/sites/.../2011_us_mexico_report.pdf) P. ) rss

Despite the significance of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, delays and other inefficiencies at the border erode much of the competitive advantage that was accrued from NAFTA. According to SANDAG, congestion and delays at border crossings between San Diego County and Baja California cost the U.S. and Mexican economies an estimated

$7.2 billion in foregone gross output and more than 62,000 jobs in 2007.

Increased exports solves the trade deficit

Istrate et al 10 (Emilia, Senior research analyst and associate fellow with the Metropolitan Infrastructure Initiative, "Export Nation: How U.S. Metros Lead National Export Growth and Boost Competitiveness", July, Brookings,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2010/7/26%20mountain%20exports%20muro/0726\_exports\_istrate\_rothwell\_katz.pdf )

Exports Could Contribute to the Rebalancing of the U.S. Economy and a Lower Trade Deficit For the most of the last 20 years, the United States has witnessed strong economic growth and low unemployment in comparison with other developed countries.18 Yet, the U.S. economy was affected by the wide fluctuations at the end of two business cycles, the so called IT bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble that ended between sometime during 2006 and 2007. Meanwhile, in 2006 house­hold income inequality reached its post-World War II peak.19 Real median income in 2008 fell below 1999 levels.20 These three conditions—a tepid rise in living standards, increasing inequality, and bubble economies—are embedded in the consumption driven American economy. In 1982, U.S. residents spent 86 cents of every dollar of after-tax income, but the intensity of consumption grew steadily such that by 2005, that share had reached 95 cents of every dollar.21 All this spending depleted savings, which dropped precipitously over the time period from over 10 percent in the early 1980s to just 1.7 percent in 2005.22 At the same time, an increasing share of consumption involved the purchase of imports. While the value of U.S. total imports was eight percent higher than the value of U.S. total exports in 1982, by 2005, the difference was 36 percent, the highest gap since 1960.23 With minimal household savings, domestic investment declined over the last two decades relative to the size of the economy. The United States invested about 7.3 percent of GDP in the 2000s, much less than the 9.4 percent rate of the 1970s.24 Moreover, from 2000 to 2007, private manufacturing investment as a share of GDP was just 0.26 percent per year compared to 0.37 percent during the 1990s. At the same time, foreign investment compensated to some extent, though more in the real estate sector. For example, Chinese holdings represented 6 percent of all federal agency debt and 29 percent of foreign-held agency debt in 2007, making China the largest foreign holder of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt.25 The externalization of risk is another major problem with trade deficits. A large portion of the dollars spent on imports end up being re-invested back into the United States and that process increases the risk of bubbles. No sector can sustain limitless growth, and as the safest and most valuable investments become saturated with funding, the excess liquidity begins to seep into riskier and riskier propositions like no-income-no-asset subprime mortgage derivatives. The economists Joshua Aizenman and Yothin Jinjarak have shown that current account deficits have coincided with and contributed to rapid housing price appreciation across OECD countries between 1990 and 2005.26 While the United States based its growth on private consumption over the last three decades, the other developed countries exploited foreign demand. Over the last 30 years, private consumption, as a share of GDP, increased by seven percentage points in the United States, while total exports grew by only two percentage points. The other large developed countries, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, maintained an almost constant share of private spending, but increased their share of total exports in GDP by seven percentage points.28 In 2008, the U.S. total exports were only 12.7 of domestic production, in comparison with 29.7 percent in the other large developed countries. Moreover, as a recent Brookings report shows, this underperformance is not entirely explained by the size of the U.S. economy and its distance from trading partners.

Data proves resolving the deficit solves protectionism

Hufbauer 10 (Gary, Senior Chair at Council of Relations, “US Protectionist Impulses in the Wake of the Great Recession”, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer201003.pdf)

The U.S. unemployment rate more than doubled between the onset of the Great Recession in December 2007 and December 2009, and is now hovering just below 10 percent (figure 1). 1 Considering that this discouraging figure likely understates broader deterioration in the U.S. labor market, 2 the absence of sustained Congressional pressure for large‐scale protectionist measures, beyond “Buy American” provisions and several smaller companions (all examined in this report), is in some ways surprising. 3 At least part of the explanation for the restrained political response is the simultaneous large improvement in the U.S. trade balance during 2008 and early 2009. Figure 1 illustrates how the total U.S. deficit in goods and services trade was nearly cut in half during this period, creating a political obstacle to kneejerk protectionism. As we will elaborate in section IV, during recessions an improving external balance (from imports falling faster than exports) often acts an “automatic international economic stabilizer,” which temporarily fulfills an equivalent economic function to a Keynesian government stimulus package. The “external sector” of the U.S. economy during the early quarters of the Great Recession provided an “automatic offset” to sliding U.S. economic activity. This probably caused policymakers to think twice about succumbing to short‐term protectionist instincts. However, figure 1 also shows how the improvement in the U.S. trade balance has been only temporary and indeed began to reverse as the U.S. economy exited the Great Recession during the second half of 2009. Crucial for the political threat of protectionism, economic forecasts indicate that the U.S. unemployment rate will probably remain at very high levels over the medium term, despite President Obama’s emphasis on “jobs, jobs, jobs” in his State of the Union Address delivered on January 27 th , 2010. 4 A time lag of at least 12 to 18 months probably separates the point at which the U.S. trade balance showed maximum improvement (spring 2009) and the expected drop in measured unemployment well below 10 percent (fall 2010). Absent the “feel good” factor of an improving trade balance, but facing continuing high unemployment levels, protectionist sentiment in the U.S. Congress may increase in the coming months, especially as the November 2010 midterm election draws near. This is particularly so, as current economic forecasts suggest a more robust U.S. economic recovery in the coming years, relative to other industrial trading partners (table 1). A large and growing deficit in the U.S. external balances will likely persist for some time, while the external balances of other major trading partners could hold steady or even improve. If the United States thus returns to its “pre‐crisis role as the world’s importer/consumer of last resort,” protectionist impulses in the U.S. Congress are destined to escalate. 5 Fresh U.S. protectionist initiatives, at a time when the U.S. economy is growing at a decent pace, will likely invite in‐kind retaliation by America’s trading partners, despite the relatively muted reaction to the original “Buy American” provisions in early 2009 and other protectionist measures implemented since then. No longer facing a newly‐elected U.S. president, who entered office with considerable global appeal in the midst of an unprecedented economic crisis, foreign leaders are unlikely to give the U.S. an easy pass on future new instances of U.S. protectionism.

Extinction

Panzer 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

Free trade creates multiple disincentives for conflict, but it’s declining globally

Carafano, 12 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. senior research fellow for national security at the Heritage Foundation. “More Free Markets Will Mean Fewer Wars,” [http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2012/01/more-free-markets-will-mean-fewer-wars Accessed 6/30/12](http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2012/01/more-free-markets-will-mean-fewer-wars%20Accessed%206/30/12)

Sir Ralph Norman Angell had all the answers. In 1909, he published "Europe's Optical Illusion," a pamphlet arguing that the global integration of economies through trade and industrialization had made total war obsolete. The outbreak of World War I dented the theory somewhat. But such was the power of Angell's argument -- and the insight of European elites -- that he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933. World War II started six years later. Angell and others had missed a key point. It's not just the intensity of trade between nations that influences the tide of war and peace; the kind of nations engaged in trade matters as well. The old British adage "trade follows the flag" had an important postscript: "War often follows trade." When free-market nations rubbed up against mercantilist and other "not free" economies, the friction often produced bloodshed. On the other hand, economic activity between nations that share a commitment to economic freedom tends to flow peacefully, without rancor. Indeed, strong trade ties between free-market nations tend to actually promote national security. Economic freedom helps nations generate the wealth that allows them to defend themselves. Beyond that, it creates a community of nations with a shared interest: protecting their right to freely exchange goods, peoples, services and ideas. This common bond promotes the cause of peace by creating strong, self-reliant, sovereign and independent nations interested in preserving the mutual freedoms that allow them to engage commercially and prosper. Economic freedom hinges on an institutional framework that allows all individuals to exercise their liberties in the market place. In addition to accommodating free trade, that framework includes institutional commitments to fight corruption, protect property rights and the sanctity of contracts and pursue responsible fiscal policies. Each year, the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal produce an Index of Economic Freedom that measures 10 major components essential to economic freedom and assesses the state of virtually every economy in the world. The 2012 Index of Economic Freedom should be a wake-up call for the world. It found that, generally speaking, economic freedom is in decline throughout the globe. The decline is very real right here in the United States. For the second straight year, America has failed to qualify as a free economy; it rates as only "mostly free." As recently as 2008, the U.S. was a Top Five country in terms of economic freedom. This year, we barely managed a 10th place finish. The loss of freedom has been accompanied by a stagnant economy and persistently high unemployment. Reviving economic freedom is essential to growing the economy and creating jobs ... and for national security as well. Beyond getting our own house in order, encouraging and working with other nations to promote economic freedom is equally important. Washington needs to embrace ambitious policies that create economic dynamism, policies that will unshackle innovation, which leads to better products, new markets and greater investment. Promoting property rights and anti-corruption measures ought to be high on our foreign policy agenda as well. And virtually every region of the world offers opportunities for the United States to enter new free trade agreements. New initiatives such as the proposed nine-country Trans-Pacific Partnership could create new economic opportunities by expanding trade between the United States, Asia and Latin America. The prescription for solving America's ills requires a double dose of national security and economic freedom. That's what's needed to make "peace through strength" a reality, rather than a bumper sticker.

Free trade creates disincentives for war – studies prove

Griswold, 11Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and author of Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization. “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” Hayek Society Journal Vol. 9 [http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf Accessed 6/30/12](http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf%20Accessed%206/30/12)

Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. The U.S. initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An even more effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to products made and grown in Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real job at an export-oriented factory making overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruiter. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade and investment ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war.

# 2AC Topicality

## 2AC New Affs Good

New AFFs Good Offense:

1. Debating against new Affs is a skill that should be encouraged: it forces you to use existing research to create arguments, to think on your feet, and rewards complex analytic thought rather than drones that read blocks.

2. Reading new AFFs is a skill that should be encouraged: it forces us to survey the literature to find new innovations, prevents the topic from going stagnant, rewards creative research, and forces us to defend our AFF against the barrage of diverse neg arguments.

3. State is the best place for new AFFs: neg teams are the most prepared they will ever be, debaters are at the top of their game, and the topic has been explored enough to limit the possibilities for being truly new.

New AFFS Good Defense:

4. If the AFF is topical then there is no such thing as a true new aff. The role of the resolution is to ensure that there is a basic level of predictability.

5. No brightline: new plans, advantages, add ons, and politics link turns all win big debates but wouldn’t fit their definition of a new aff.

6. If new affs are bad then the standard must be enforced all year because otherwise it wouldn’t be fair to the teams that didn’t get to State because they lost to a new AFF at sections.

## 2AC Topicality EE

We meet – Border infrastructure improvements are economic engagement

Gephardt 2002 Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo) was the House Democratic Leader. CENTER FOR Latin American Studies UC Berkeley “Progressive Economic Engagement with Mexico and the World” Winter http://clas.berkeley.edu/Publications/Review/pdf/newswinter02.pdf

Everybody agrees that as we enter the 21st century, the global economy requires the United States to seek greater export opportunities. In addition, I believe that a new trade consensus must be rooted in our values. Not only is enhanced trade vital to U.S. economic growth and security, but it can also promote values fundamental to our democratic future: worker rights, environmental protection, and human rights. Working to open global markets and doing more to enhance global living standards will expand U.S., Mexican and global prosperity in the 21st century.Some have called the progressive approach to trade “protectionist.” That is an erroneous label. In fact, progressives are for expanded trade and for the United States meeting its leadership obligations in the international economic arena. However, we believe a broader approach is needed based on three pillars of economic policy: free and fair trade, enhanced development assistance, and debt relief for the poorest nations. Such a program could create more markets for U.S. exports, strengthen the middle class at home and abroad, and maximize our national security through a comprehensive program of engagement in all parts of the world. We need to forge a progressive approach to trade and development and create a new consensus on global economic engagement. At home in North America, we need to do more to promote trade and development with Mexico. NAFTA has been a real success in increasing trade between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, but it has done little to generate real development in Mexico. Despite the increases in trade, and enhanced Mexican productivity since 1993, a broad Mexican middle class has failed to emerge. Today Mexico is facing a serious recession and maquiladora jobs are leaving as companies move to nations, such as China, where wage rates are lower. Mexico is facing a race to the bottom and America needs to do more to combat this trend. We need to assist the government of President Vicente Fox with enhanced trade, aid and development. America has a great opportunity in the bilateral meetings at the Monterrey summit in March 2002 to work with Mexico on a progressive development plan. As a first step the resources of the North American Development Bank must be freed up to provide hundreds of millions of dollars of new environmental infrastructure along the border. Housing, health, and transportation infrastructure must also be improved at the border.

Overlimit – no border affs become topical – key topic ground for the aff

Lit checks – they still have sufficient lit to be able to debate us about the aff

C/I – Economic Engagement can be tactical or structural linkage of economic benefits

Mastanduno 8 (Michael – Nelson Rockefeller Professor of Government and Associate Dean for the Social Sciences at Dartmouth. “Economic Statecraft” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors & Cases ed Smith, Hadfield, Dunne. p. 182-3)

Positive economic statecraft may be defined as the provision or promise of economic benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state. 1 It is important to distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a well-specified economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or domestic policies of the target government. I call this version tactical linkage; others refer to 'carrots', or 'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I term structural linkage and which others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or 'long-term engagement', involves an effort to use a steady stream of economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be unconditional; the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic engagement will eventually produce a political transformation and desirable changes in target behaviour.

# 2AC Coloniality

## 2AC Topline

The judge is a policy maker tasked with evaluating cost benefit policy analysis – key to maintain topic focus and predictability – the k moots the 1AC

Gov’t engagement is key – without policy the knowledge created by the alt can never solve

McClean 01 (David, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope” [www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm](http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm))

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

Our epistemology is accurate and shouldn’t be prioritized

Wendt 98 (professor of international security – Ohio State University, Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The central point of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will inevitably lead to confusion (after all, after 2000 years, even the specialists are still having a hard time). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, not second-order issues of method.

Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contaminated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘paradigm wars’. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is not clear by what criteria their work should be judged, or how it differs from art or revelation. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures of science.

The ends justify the means

Isaac 2 – (Jeffrey, Professor of PoliSci @ Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD Yale, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol 49 Issue 2)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law [it] can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures – proves no impact to the kritik

Ridley 10 (visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. But even if you break down the world into bits, it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, the outcome for the world is remarkably, astonishingly, dramatically positive. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. Despite a doubling of the world population, even the raw number of people living in absolute poverty (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) has fallen **since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

Criticizing Western “colonialism” obscures more insidious practices by regional powers

Shaw 2 – Sussex IR Professor (Martin, The Problem of the Quasi-Imperial State, www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm)

Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West. In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely - but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, suffering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states. I argue that in the global era, this separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -- and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with both key post-imperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to.

Empirics disprove their method – they reject empirical bases– causes worse forms of repression – aff is essential to solvency

Antonio and Kellner, 1990 ( Robert, Kansas University Professor Sociology, Douglas, Columbia University Philosophy Professor, "Modernity, Modern Social Theory, and the Postmodern Critique," American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C., August 1990. gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/modsoctheory80s.pdf )

Other modem social theorists had already developed a more critical conception of the social self contradicting conformist and homogeneous portrayals of the subject. For example Simmel and Mead held that socialization is an individuating as well as a homogenizing force (Mead 1967; Simmel 1964). In their view, modernity's highly differentiated social structure produces a highly articulated individuality capable of increasingly self-conscious self-assertion and voluntaristic patterns of association. Mead's view of the subject stands out from the sometimes simplistic, hyperrationalist, and conformist version implied by many other classical theorists. Here the postmodernist criticism points to serious deﬁciencies. However, they go too far in rejecting the individual's capacity for autonomy and rational action, substituting schizophrenically fragmented or robotized experience and behavior. Postmodernists seem to be amnesiac about the CounterEnlightenment reactionaries who used the alleged irrationality of the subject to justify the need for authoritarian moralism and social control. Despite its shortcomings, some current of classical theory suggested a more balanced view of the self abandoning the imperious vision of rationality and maintaining a conditioned idea of autonomy. Approaches that speak of the disappearance of, or radical fragmentation of, the subject cannot account for uncoerced collective action. Such extreme views are not only empirically misguided, but can easily be turned around to support the types of repression that postmodernists themselves oppose. Classical theorists saw the new types of mass social organization and consequent interdependences to be dialectically related with opposing forces producing social and cultural fragmentation. They produced standpoints for criticizing society and suggesting social changes from the interplay of these integrating and fragmenting conditions. In particular, the "immanent" criticism of social theorists emphasized the contradictions between emergent democratic ideals and possibilities of modernity and the new types of oppression, inequality, and polarization. As with their central metatheoretical assumptions, this historical method of social criticism sometimes resulted in dogmatic pseudosociological pronouncements (e.g. about the "inevitable" direction of history), and, at others, expressed critical sensitivity pointing to concrete resources and possibilities at the heart of nascent social struggles, as well as growing aspirations for a freer and more paciﬁed social life. In sum, classical social theorists provided languages for discussing societal development, the primary social structures and institutions of modern society, and the most signiﬁcant possibilities for progressive social change. Such theories provided a basis for cognitively mapping the social order which helps individuals situate themselves meaningfully in their emergent social order. They also encouraged an attitude that society can be understood and transformed through collective action and planning. Classical social theorists such as Marx, Durkheim, and Dewey exhibited a balanced concern for interdependence and fragmentation and argued that modem social arrangements contain their own historical bases for social criticism. It is true that these theorists sometimes spoke dogmatically about the path of societal development and its signiﬁcance for realizing freedom and justice. Although they claimed to abandon philosophical "grounds," classical theorists often treated the "progressive" features of modernity too optimistically, transforming them into transcendent warranties about a more democratic future. But postmodernists, overreacting to this tendency of classical theory, speak of overwhelming social and cultural fragmentation destroying the historical bases of immanent critique and the possibility of progressive social transformation. By dismissing the metatheoretical underpinnings and historical social criticism of modern social theory, postmodernists rule out the strong sociology needed to support their own extremely sweeping claims about a postmodern era, and the exhaustion of theory, collective action, and radical social transformation. They thus give up the analytic means for clarifying and elaborating the historical bases of their nonnative criticisms of modernity. In the end, postmodernists' totalizing claims continue in the tracks of classical social theory, but without the conceptual tools and analytic methods to provide a satisfactory account of the alleged postmodern condition

US colonialism is key to solve conflict – the alternative is far more violent

Busby, 12 [Get Real Chicago IR guys out in force, Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>]

Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all" \t "_new) that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html" \t "_new) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity **compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/" \t "_new), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other [reports](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) based on Uppsala data is right**,** war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/" \t "_new) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

# 2AC States CP

## 2AC States

Federal engagement is key to effective border management

Woodrow Wilson Center 09, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute, “THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: Towards a Strategic Partnership,” <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf>

The Obama administration and the incoming Congress have the opportunity to raise the level of attention given to Mexico and to pursue a strategic partnership based on consultation and cooperation around issues of shared national interest. Too often in the past, the U.S. government has pursued unilateral solutions to problems that require binational cooperation. There is no lack of policies towards Mexico in the U.S. government. Since the issues in the relationship with Mexico almost always have domestic as well as foreign policy aspects, every department and almost every agency of the U.S. government has some dealings with Mexico or the U.S.-Mexico border, as do a range of state and local government agencies. The challenge is, therefore, to ﬁnd strategic ways of building synergies among these multiple, disjointed, and often competing eﬀorts that tie into a broad agenda for collaboration with Mexico around clearly deﬁned objectives that are in the national security interests of both countries. A strategic partnership between the two countries will require both high-level foreign policy attention in Washington and Mexico City and eﬀorts to engage all government actors at the federal, state, and local level involved in key policy decisions. It will be important to strengthen existing structures for consultation but also to develop new ones that can promote and sustain eﬀective dialogue and problem-solving. There are at least four areas that call out for priority attention in the relationship and will require sustained dialogue and engagement: security cooperation, economic integration, immigration, and border management.

States can’t manage without federal coordination

Corless 12Campaign Director, Transportation for America, former California director and national campaign manager for the Surface Transportation Policy Project (James, May 23, “Local Voters Need a Partner,” http://transportation.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/not-waiting-for-the-feds.php#2211941)

Absent strong federal leadership, states, cities and local communities are indeed stepping out on their own, raising funds from innovative sources, and doing what they can to make it happen. But left to shoulder the burden entirely alone, these communities’ noble efforts won’t be enough to meet the challenges we’re facing. These communities are stepping forward, but in the hopes that the federal government will take the next step with them and support them along the way. The role for the federal government in transportation is indeed changing, evolving from being the driving factor that it was during the interstate era to being more of a partner in helping localities meet their changing needs. And their needs are a national concern, because they bear on whether Americans have a safe, reliable way to get to work, and whether goods can get to market. No developed nation in the world leaves these matters of basic infrastructure entirely to chance. But there seems little doubt that, for the foreseeable future, federal resources will be constrained, and that makes it more imperative than ever that we set goals for the investment, and measure progress toward those goals. That’s why provisions to do that in the Senate’s bipartisan transportation bill, MAP-21 bill are so important. It’s time we figure out what matters most, and what will get the best bang for the buck. Local communities raising money for transportation are following a tried-and-true blueprint that rewards accountability and specificity: When they know what transportation dollars are going to buy — this new transit line, that new busway, this new bridge project — and who is accountable for implementation, measures to fund those projects pass close to 70 percent of the time. Such was the case with the transit-funding Measure R in Los Angeles, which earned a two-thirds majority vote. Having passed the tax, Los Angeles is now seeking federal help with low-cost loans that can build 30 years worth of projects in 10. Local bootstraps are great for getting off the ground, but they only get you so far up the ladder if the federal rung is missing. These innovators aren’t pressing for “devolution,” they’re simply looking for a dance partner.

Doesn’t solve the aff — Trade – states don’t have the power to solve the entirety of the aff – not enough buying or selling power – requires national lcooperation – states can’t do this on a large scale – Manufacturing – our aff relies on border congestion, states can’t solve –

The states don’t control the ports of entry

Combs 1 Window on State Government - Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 2001 State Functions at the Texas-Mexico Border and Cross-Border Transportation http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/border/sfatb2.html

II. Responsibilities of Governmental Agencies and Private Entities at the Texas-Mexico Border Crossings Several U.S. and Mexican federal, state, and local governmental and non-governmental agencies have direct and indirect roles in the Texas-Mexico border crossing process. These agencies regulate the process, enforce laws and regulations, or facilitate the safe movement of cargo and people into the United States. The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) provides and maintains the port of entry facilities used by the federal inspection agencies and state and local agencies. GSA owns all the border stations—except for the Starr-Camargo International Bridge—and is responsible for their design and operation. The federal and state agencies operating in the border station pay rent to GSA based on the amount of space they require.[18] U.S. Federal Agencies The U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Services are the primary federal agencies controlling the northbound, from Mexico into the U.S., border crossing process. They conduct primary and secondary inspections of drivers, passengers, vehicles, and cargo. Inspectors from both agencies have been authorized to perform primary inspections for both customs and immigration purposes. Primary inspections are always conducted at the border crossing. A primary inspection includes quick reviews of personal identification and citizenship, cargo documentation, and vehicle inspection. Secondary inspections are conducted at border crossing lots. Secondary inspections include more detailed reviews of cargo documentation, cargo, and drivers.

# 2AC Add Ons Topline

## 2AC Agriculture

Plan is key to the agricultural industry and food security

Chamber of Commerce 12 (United States Chamber of Commerce, “ENHANCING THE U.S.–MEXICO ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP” <http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1204EnhancingtheUS-MexicoEconomicPartnership.pdf> 4-24-12)

In both markets, consumers and producers alike benefit from access to the other’s agricultural output. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, “U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade is largely complementary, meaning that the United States tends to export different commodities to Mexico than Mexico exports to the United States.” Grains, oilseeds, meat, and related products make up about three-quarters of U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico, where domestic production is insufficient to meet demand. Meanwhile, roughly two-thirds of U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico consist of beer, along with vegetables and fruit whose growing season largely complements that of the United States. As a result of this close relationship, each country plays an important role in the food security of the other. If that relationship can be made more efficient through regulatory cooperation, alignment of safety and testing practices, transparency, and science-based regulation, citizens of both countries will have more reliable access to safe food at better prices, quality, and reliability

Global nuclear conflict

Xie et al 6(Wenyu, Prof. Phil. @ Shandong U., Zhihe Wang, Prof. @ School of Phil. And Soc. Sci. @ Beijing Normal U., and George E. Derfer,

School of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, and George E. Derfer, Prof. Emeritus @ Cal. Poly. Pomona, “Whitehead and China: Relevance and Relationship”, p. 28, Google Print)

The threats posed by war, imperialism, nuclear weapons, and terrorism are, furthermore, not the only threats to the continued existence of civilization for which global anarchy is responsible. There are also the interconnected threats of pollution, overpopulation, and resource shortages. Although there has been serious discussion of the population explosion since the 1960s, very little has been done tos top it. China is one of the few countries to have introduced effective measures to bring a halt to runaway population growth. In most of the rest of the world, continuation of the population explosion means that already struggling societies will, in the coming decades, be trying to meet the needs of twice as many people with the same resources, or even fewer. Resource wars, meaning wars in which natural resources are the primary cause, will surely become increasingly prevalent. As absolute shortages in food, water, and oil emerge, furthermore, the relative shortages, produced by the world’s highly inequitable allocation of resources, will become even more intolerable to disadvantaged groups, providing additional motivation for terrorism aagainst rich countries. Global apartheid combined with growing resource shortages combined with hatred of imperialism combined with nuclearism makes for a very volatile mixture.

# 2AC Politics

## 2AC Impact Defense

No Iran prolif and long timeframe

Colin H. Kahl 12, security studies prof at Georgetown, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, “Not Time to Attack Iran”, January 17, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran?page=show>

Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could "produce its first nuclear weapon within six months of deciding to do so." Yet that last phrase is crucial. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented Iranian efforts to achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons at some point, but there is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them. In arguing for a six-month horizon,Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weapons-grade uranium with the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear deviceand considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse that there is a "low probability" that the Iranians would actually develop a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weapons-grade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The IAEA would thus detect such activity with sufficient time for the international community to mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years off.

## 2AC XO Topline (Lol)

Obama probs gonna XO tbh

Bob Unruh, politics writer, 1/15 [“Napolitano: Few checks on Obama's bully-pulpit power,” http://www.wnd.com/2014/01/napolitano-few-checks-on-obamas-bully-pulpit-power/#WSClVpCxCf3TyGRj.99]

Preparing to bypass Congress If Obama’s goal is more executive actions, he’s been preparing for it already. He recently appointed John Podesta, founder of the Center for American Progress, as his counselor. Podesta specializes in the use of executive authority to bypass Congress. It recently was reported Podesta will help the White House on “matters related to the health care law, administration organization and executive actions,” with particular focus on so-called climate-change issues, according to a person familiar with the plans. Podesta is a long-time champion of the use of executive powers, including bypassing the legislative branch to enact progressive change. In November 2010, he co-authored a 48-page Center for American Progress paper titled “The Power of the President: Recommendations to Advance Progressive Change.” “The U.S. Constitution and the laws of our nation grant the president significant authority to make and implement policy,” wrote Podesta in the paper’s introduction. “These authorities can be used to ensure positive progress on many of the key issues facing the country through executive orders, rulemaking, agency management, convening and creating public-private partnerships, commanding the armed forces … diplomacy.” Podesta stressed: “The ability of President Obama to accomplish important change through these powers should not be underestimated.” He concluded that the president can manage oil imports, public lands, impact housing policies, stabilize home values, partner with the private sector, manage local school district spending, set education standards, and determine the outcome on a hundred other questions.

## 2AC Iran Topline

Read won’t vote now – only the house will vote

Josh Rogin, The Daily Beast, 1/14 [“Iran Sanctions Battle Heats Up,” http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/14/iran-sanctions-battle-heats-up.html]

Harry Reid doesn’t seem to want to allow a vote on the Iran sanctions bill, so advocates are shifting tactics and working with House leadership to pass it there first. The Senate is stalling on bringing new Iran sanctions legislation to a vote following another diplomatic breakthrough, but pro-sanctions Senators say the House may not wait to pass the bill that the White House says could kill the talks and lead to war. On Sunday, Iran and the P5+1 countries announced they had completed the implementation agreement for an interim deal regarding Iran’s nuclear program, starting the clock on a six-month period during which a potential final deal will be negotiated. Reports said today that there is also a 30-page informal side deal, known as a “non-paper,” that would spell out details of the interim agreement the parties don’t want made public. The new progress in negotiations with Iran prompted Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to say Tuesday the time was not right for a vote on the Menendez-Kirk Iran bill, which would set out Congressional parameters on what a final deal should look like and impose new sanctions if Iran does not complete the final deal or honor it. "At this stage, I think we're where we should be,” Reid said, reversing his previous pledge that if the bill was bipartisan, he would bring it up for a vote on the senate floor. The bill currently has 59 co-sponsors, including 16 Democrats. Eleven Democratic Committee chairmen have also said they oppose moving forward to a vote at this time. The White House has been battling those Democrats who support the legislation, accusing them of wanting war with Iran. House Minority Leader Steny Hoyer said Tuesday that the charge was “absolutely untrue” and an“irresponsible assertion” by White House staff. Democratic National Committee Chairman Debbie Wasserman Shultz reportedly met with Hoyer to urge him not to bring up a non-binding resolution on the Iran deal with House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, a claim she denies. “I am thinking of a House-first strategy,” said Graham. “We control the House, so I believe if we don’t get any movement from our Democratic colleagues over here, I would suggest the House take up this bill.” Regardless, Sen. Lindsey Graham told The Daily Beast Tuesday he was working with Cantor to bring up the Menendez-Kirk bill in the House, where it will surely pass, as a way to pressure Reid to act. “I am thinking of a House-first strategy,” said Graham. “We control the House, so I believe if we don’t get any movement from our Democratic colleagues over here, I would suggest the House take up this bill. I’m talking to Cantor.” For Graham and other pro-legislation Senators, the most important part of the bill is the section defining what would be a good deal with Iran. They want the administration to negotiate a deal that would prevent Iran from continuing uranium enrichment, force Tehran to dismantle its nuclear reactors, and not allow the country to develop new advance centrifuges as part of any research and development program. Congress goes on recess next week, but if Reid doesn’t act by the time Congress returns, Cantor should go ahead and call the vote, Graham said. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez, who co-authored the legislation, told The Daily Beast in a short interview that he was not involved in the discussions with Cantor but he is not sure if Reid would respond to any House action. “I don’t know that that would necessarily resolve the ultimate question but that’s something for the House to decide,” he said. Menendez, like many Senators on Tuesday, said he was unsure if there was actually a secret side agreement to the interim nuclear deal, but he vowed to find out. Administration officials are set to brief Senators on the Hill on Thursday. Multiple Senators said staff briefings and calls by administration officials thus far on the deal have been cursory and unsatisfying. “I don’t know for a fact but it seems to me that the Iranians saying there’s a side agreement suggest that there’s something,” he said. “If there’s no such thing, we need a denial, if there is we need to see the whole thing.” At Tuesday’s State Department press briefing, State Department Spokeswoman Marie Harf said there was no such secret non-paper agreement. “Let me be very clear, there’s no secret agreement here. The documentation associated with the implementation agreements tracks completely with what we’ve described, which are technical plans submitted to the IAEA,” she said. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin told The Daily Beast Tuesday the interim deal should be released in its entirety. “We’re going to get a copy of it. I don’t know why it would be classified, it should be public,” he said. But Levin is one of 11 Democratic Senate Committee Chairman opposed to moving forward with the Menendez-Kirk bill while negotiations are ongoing. “It undermines the chances of getting a very strong agreement through diplomacy and negotiations with Iran,” he said. “It’s worth testing and worth trying and we ought to do that and not see that undermined by Senate or House actions.”

PC isn’t key – political evens in Iran will shape likelihood of bill

NYT 1/13 (Mark Lander and Jonathan Weisman, “Obama Fights a Push to Add Iran Sanctions,” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/world/middleeast/obama-fights-a-push-to-add-iran-sanctions.html?\_r=0)

Prominent Democrats like Senator Michael Bennet of Colorado, the chairman of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, have recently thrown their support behind the bill. Aides say enough Senate Democrats would support the sanctions bill to override a presidential veto, and the House probably has a veto-proof margin as well. The fate of the bill, some on Capitol Hill said, is likely to rest with news from Iran. If newspapers begin running front-page articles about a resurgent Iranian economy or news breaks of burgeoning trade between Iran and its allies, Mr. Reid may be pressured to allow a vote. Proponents of sanctions say there is already ample evidence of both. “The Iranian economy has stabilized and is now starting to go on a positive trajectory,” said Mark Dubowitz, the executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “This is due in a significant way to changing market sentiment.” Reports of an oil-for-goods swap being negotiated between Iran and Russia have prompted some Democrats to accuse Tehran of violating the terms of the interim deal. The White House said it shared those concerns, noting that Secretary of State John Kerry raised the matter with Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, on Monday. Such a deal would be “inconsistent” with the agreement and “could potentially trigger U.S. sanctions,” said a spokeswoman for the National Security Council, Caitlin M. Hayden. There is also a spirited debate about whether the Senate legislation can be reconciled with a nuclear deal. A study by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation said the bill “moves the goal posts” by making a deal with Iran contingent on Iran’s not launching ballistic missiles, and requiring it to have no involvement in terrorism against the United States, directly or through proxies.

No chance of Iran negotiation success

Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Carnegie Endowment, 12/31/13, Washington’s World in 2014, carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/31/washington-s-world-in-2014/gxda

If this six-month nuclear accord can be turned into a permanent one that replaces the imminent threat of a nuclear-armed Iran with a transparent, internationally monitored civilian nuclear program, that achievement alone is how 2013 and 2014 will deserve to be remembered. That “if” looms large, however. Unlike the key talks in the first phase, which were carried out in secret between the United States and Iran, the next phase of negotiations will feature six parties trying to agree on one side of the table—hardly a prescription for agile or effective bargaining. Across the table, Tehran will want more give on sanctions than the United States can offer. Moreover, negotiations will have to go beyond the fuel-cycle issues of uranium enrichment and plutonium production addressed in the first phase to the even more sensitive weapons technologies that have no civilian purpose. Deep-seated mistrust on both sides will frustrate every step. Hard as it will be in the negotiating room, the greater impediment will be the self-fulfilling exchange of threat and counterthreat between those in Washington, Jerusalem, and Tehran who want this effort to fail. The negotiators—especially Iran’s—will be working with one eye over their shoulders, watching for threats from domestic opponents. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyhau has made it plain that no negotiated settlement will satisfy him, and he has an overly attentive audience in the U.S. Congress. The longer the negotiations take, the greater the pressure will be on Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani to show results that bring economic relief at home. At some point, the Revolutionary Guard and others in Iran’s powerful right wing who profit from the country’s economic isolation will try to retake the political initiative. The supreme leader has made his support for the negotiations absolutely clear—for the time being. But he is less of a leader and more of a follower than his grand title implies. For decades he has believed that what the United States really wants in Iran is regime change. The supreme leader’s support for the path of reintegration with the outside world that Rouhani campaigned on and overwhelmingly won on last summer is unlikely to survive prolonged stalemate or breakup of the talks.

## 2AC Politics

No links – GSA gots the aff

Combs 1 Window on State Government - Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 2001 State Functions at the Texas-Mexico Border and Cross-Border Transportation http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/border/sfatb2.html

II. Responsibilities of Governmental Agencies and Private Entities at the Texas-Mexico Border Crossings Several U.S. and Mexican federal, state, and local governmental and non-governmental agencies have direct and indirect roles in the Texas-Mexico border crossing process. These agencies regulate the process, enforce laws and regulations, or facilitate the safe movement of cargo and people into the United States. The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) provides and maintains the port of entry facilities used by the federal inspection agencies and state and local agencies. GSA owns all the border stations—except for the Starr-Camargo International Bridge—and is responsible for their design and operation. The federal and state agencies operating in the border station pay rent to GSA based on the amount of space they require.[18] U.S. Federal Agencies The U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Services are the primary federal agencies controlling the northbound, from Mexico into the U.S., border crossing process. They conduct primary and secondary inspections of drivers, passengers, vehicles, and cargo. Inspectors from both agencies have been authorized to perform primary inspections for both customs and immigration purposes. Primary inspections are always conducted at the border crossing. A primary inspection includes quick reviews of personal identification and citizenship, cargo documentation, and vehicle inspection. Secondary inspections are conducted at border crossing lots. Secondary inspections include more detailed reviews of cargo documentation, cargo, and drivers.

PC isn’t real

Edwards 9 Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies and has served as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford [George, “The Strategic President”, Printed by the Princeton University Press, pg. 149-150]

Even presidents who appeared to dominate Congress were actually facilitators rather than directors of change. They understood their own limitations and explicitly took advantage of opportunities in their environments. Working at the margins, they successfully guided legislation through Congress. When their resources diminished, they reverted to the stalemate that usually characterizes presidential-congressional relations. As legendary management expert Peter Drucker put it about Ronald Reagan, "His great strength was not charisma, as is commonly thought, but his awareness and acceptance of exactly what he could and what he could not do."134 These conclusions are consistent with systematic research by Jon Bond, Richard Fleisher, and B. Dan Wood. They have focused on determining whether the presidents to whom we attribute the greatest skills in dealing with Congress were more successful in obtaining legislative support for their policies than were other presidents. After carefully controlling for other influences on congressional voting, they found no evidence that those presidents who supposedly were the most proficient in persuading Congress were more successful than chief executives with less aptitude at influencing legislators.135 Scholars studying leadership within Congress have reached similar conclusions about the limits on personal leadership. Cooper and Brady found that institutional context is more important than personal leadership skills or traits in determining the influence of leaders and that there is no relationship between leadership style and effectiveness.136 Presidential legislative leadership operates in an environment largely beyond the president's control and must compete with other, more stable factors that affect voting in Congress in addition to party. These include ideology, personal views and commitments on specific policies, and the interests of constituencies. By the time a president tries to exercise influence on a vote, most members of Congress have made up their minds on the basis of these other factors. Thus, a president's legislative leadership is likely to be critical only for those members of Congress who remain open to conversion after other influences have had their impact. Although the size and composition of this group varies from issue to issue, it will almost always be a minority in each chamber.

Improving POE’s has bipartisan agreement

Ramos 13 Kristian Ramos is New Democracy Network’s Policy Director of the 21st Century Border Initiative, “Realizing the Strategic National Value of our Trade, Tourism and Ports of Entry with Mexico” The New Policy Institute is the educational affiliate of the NDN, a think tank based in Washington, DC. May 2013 http://ndn.org/sites/default/files/blog\_files/NPI%20U%20S%20-Mexico%20Trade%20Tourism%20POE%20Report\_0.pdf

Key policies and infrastructure can either help or hinder this enormous economic exchange. Forty-seven U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry facilitate several hundreds of billions dollars in U.S.-Mexico trade every year. Ideally, ports of entry should act as membranes, facilitating healthy interactions (such as legitimate trade and travel) and preventing unhealthy ones (such as illicit drugs, firearms and human smuggling). And ideally much of the actual inspection and clearance should occur “upstream” from the ports. Broad bipartisan agreement has developed on the need to improve our land ports of entry with Mexico. This is because over seventy percent of NAFTA trade flows through these ports of entry as well as an enormous flow of visitors who have a major economic impact on the United States. Twenty-three states have Mexico as their number one or number two trading partner, multiplying jobs in both countries.

Bipartisan groups support plan

Brownsville Herald 10 “Senators: U.S. Must Invest in Infrastructure, Personnel at International Bridges” <http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=InNews&ContentRecord\_id=8fca6ad8-c12f-4b06-82fe-fad0ccbc76c4>

The state’s members of the U.S. House of Representatives have lobbied unsuccessfully in the past for increased funding at the ports of entry. But the letter supported by a bipartisan group of senators represents the first time that a push has been made in the Senate, where previous legislation stalled. Franz said the United States has invested billions in border security, such as the controversial border fence and an ineffective technology program. But trade between the U.S. and Mexico has increased by 41 percent in the past year, overwhelming federal agents who must combat the illegal flow of drugs, money and weapons at the ports. “In the rush to secure the border, the focus was on areas between the ports of entry,” Franz said. “Everybody thought we were fine at the ports, but that was a false assumption.”

There is growing bipartisan for improving US-Mexico POE’s

Ramos 13 Kristian, Arizona Daily Star, June 7, New Democracy Network’s Policy Director of the 21st Century Border Initiative, “Updating Ports of Entry Will Help Preserve Our Vital Trade with Mexico” <http://kuldrahaks.net/NewMexicoTourism/jobs-in-mexico-tourism>

The immigration legislation making its way through Congress addresses legalization, border security, a transition to a more skills-based legal-immigration system and the national adoption of E-Verify. There is a growing bipartisan and bicameral consensus, however, about another key aspect of the emerging legislation as it relates to the border region, which deserves equal attention, if not more – the need to invest in, and modernize, our ports of entry with Mexico.” Modernizing our ports of entry is now an urgent national economic priority, and one of particular importance to Southern Arizona. Despite a recession and slow growth on the U.S. side of the border and security challenges on the Mexican side, the trade relationship between our two countries has exploded in recent years. According to a recently released study (co-authored by Arizonan Erik Lee), trade between the U.S. and Mexico has increased from $300 billion in 2009 to a staggering $536 billion last year. Mexico is now the U.S.’ third-largest trading partner and second-largest export market. Six million jobs in the U.S. are now dependent on U.S.-Mexico trade. All of these numbers, of course, will increase as trade flows continue to grow in the years ahead.

Winners win and PC not key

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On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital.

“The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.” ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls. THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

# 2AC China SOI

## 2AC China Defense

No Asia impact

Weissmann 9 --- senior fellow at the Swedish School of Advanced Asia Pacific Studies (Mikael Weissmann, “Understanding the East Asian Peace: Some Findings on the Role of Informal Processes,” Nordic Asia Research Community, November 2, 2009, http://barha.asiaportal.info/blogs/in-focus/2009/november/understanding-east-asian-peace-some-findings-role-informal-processes-mi)

The findings concerning China’s role in keeping peace in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and on the Korean Peninsula confirm the underlying hypothesis that various informal processes and related mechanisms can help explain the relative peace. Virtually all of the identified processes and related mechanisms have been informal rather than formal. It should be noted that it is not necessarily the same types of processes that have been of importance in each and every case. In different ways these informal processes have demonstrated that the relative lack of formalised security structures and/or mechanisms have not prevented the region from moving towards a stable peace. Informal processes have been sufficient both to prevent tension and disputes from escalating into war and for moving East Asia towards a stable peace.

No economy internal link

Blackwill 9 (Robert Blackwill, former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning, text taken from article titled “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, text found at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf)

Next, China. Again, five years from today. Did the recession undermine the grip of the Chinese Communist Party on the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? No. Again, as Lee Kuan Yew stressed in the same recent speech, “China has proven itself to be pragmatic, resilient and adaptive. The Chinese have survived severe crises—the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution—few societies have been so stricken. These are reasons not to be pessimistic.” Did the crisis make Washington more willing to succumb to the rise of Chinese power because of PRC holdings of U.S. Treasury Bonds? No. Did it alter China’s basic external direction and especially its efforts, stemming from its own strategic analysis, to undermine the U.S. alliance system in Asia? No. Did it cause the essence of Asian security to transform? No

## 2AC Proper

America inevitable

Valencia 6/24 (Robert Valencia, writer for World Policy, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America”, 6/24/13, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america>, zs)

The United States hasn’t lost Latin America, and is unlikely to lose it completely. It is still the region’s top trade partner. The United States has recently signed free-trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, and maintains other trade agreements with Peru, Chile, and Mexico. Central American and several Caribbean countries rely upon U.S. military cooperation in an attempt to curtail drug trade. Nevertheless, the post 9/11 years severely eroded U.S.-Latin American relations as the Bush administration focused heavily on the war on terror, often ignoring issues in Latin America.

No link – plan doesn’t take over Latin America – that’s their internal link – we solve the border

Relation’s non-existent

Devonshire-Ellis 6/7 Chris principal and founding partner of Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm provides investment legal and cross border tax advice to mid-cap MNCs from the United States and Europe into China and Asia “China & Mexico Talk of Strategic Partnership Deal, But Much Remains to be Done” China Briefing <http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/06/07/china-mexico-talk-of-strategic-partnership-deal-but-much-remains-to-be-done.html#sthash.3CaRooza.dpuf>

These sorts of meetings, in my opinion, are an excuse for political grandstanding and media exposure. As a result, they mean very little. While the prospect of Mexican-Chinese JVs to target the U.S. market may seem appealing to both, in actual fact, the Chinese side have little incentive to do so. Mexico has no double taxation agreement (DTA) with China, meaning that Chinese investors are subject to Mexican rates of corporate income tax (CIT) and related taxes with no treaty to offset these. Mexico has a higher rate of CIT at 28 percent than China at 25 percent. Although that doesn’t sound like a huge difference – it is more than enough to eat into any available profit gains in such competitive markets. Mexico also levies immediate worldwide income tax claims on all residents – something that is not likely to sit well with Chinese investors. The two countries do have an “Agreement between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the Peoples Repubic of China on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,” however this dates back to 2008 and the current statements do little, if anything, to expand beyond the framework within. That was penned five years ago at the time of Beijing hosting the Olympics. So this could simply be another example of an agreement written by Mexico to feed their hungry media and to show off their politicians alongside countries that are firmly in the international spotlight, because it contains little of actual substance. So what does the rhetoric actually mean? From the U.S. perspective, probably not a lot. Without any supporting tax agreements, the Mexico-China talk remains just that – talk. Chinese companies have access to U.S. markets anyway and the Mexican tax code is unattractive to them compared with lower rates back in China.

Not zero sum

Xiaoxia 5/6 (Wang, Staff Writer for the Economic Observer. “In America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America” 5/6/13 http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

No tradeoff

Shaiken et al 13 (Harley, Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, Pg 7-8)

The analysis of Ping Wang highlights that in the Mexico-US-China triangular trade relationship, the United States is the key player. While China’s presence has increased,the United States remains a critical influence on both Mexico and China. Furthermore, the author suggests that China’s rise and emergence in terms of trade and investments in LAC, and specifically in regards to this triangular relationship, will slow increasingly in the future, considering its specialization in industrial commodities and products, rising wages in China, and the high number of multinational corporations involved in Chinese exports. For Ping Wang, the politically and historically subordinated role of Mexico with the United States, in contrast to China’s increasing regional and global status, is a basis for understanding future scenarios in which the Mexico-United States relationship is more stable in comparison to that of China and the United States (where the US, for example, views China as a threat).

Chinese presence enables cyber-terror attacks

Ellis YOUR AUTHOR 13 (R. Evan Ellis is associate professor for Hemispheric Defense Studies, “China's New Backyard: Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag?” JUNE 6, 2013, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america>)

The challenge to Washington from China's presence in the region also extends beyond economics and policy objectives. The U.S. Defense Department's critical posture regarding Chinese cyberattacks is a reminder that hostilities between the United States and China, though highly improbable and undesirable, are not unthinkable. In such a conflict, China-operated ports, airports, telecommunications infrastructure, and other parts of the Chinese commercial presence in Latin America would represent potential assets in a global asymmetric warfare campaign against the United States.

Cyber attacks cause war – extinction

Fritz 9 (Jason, BS – St. Cloud, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, Study Commissioned on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, July, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.doc)   
Direct control of launch. The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential “electronic back door into the US Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “ \*\*[they cut off the paragraph]\*\* “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments

# 1AR

## 1AR – Impact TopShelf

Chinese econ collapse doesn’t cause war – or upheaval

Blackwill, 09 (Robert Blackwill, former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning, text taken from article titled “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, text found at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf] HIRSH)

Next, China. Again, five years from today. Did the recession undermine the grip of the Chinese Communist Party on the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? No. Again, as Lee Kuan Yew stressed in the same recent speech, “China has proven itself to be pragmatic, resilient and adaptive. The Chinese have survived severe crises—the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution—few societies have been so stricken. These are reasons not to be pessimistic.” Did the crisis make Washington more willing to succumb to the rise of Chinese power because of PRC holdings of U.S. Treasury Bonds? No. Did it alter China’s basic external direction and especially its efforts, stemming from its own strategic analysis, to undermine the U.S. alliance system in Asia? No. Did it cause the essence of Asian security to transform? No

## 1AR – New Impact

conservative backlash in Iran

Rafizadeh, PhD, president of the International American Council and serves on the board of Harvard International Review at Harvard University, 1/3/2013

(Majid, Third round of Iran’s nuclear talks: hardliners strike back, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/01/03/Hardliners-strike-back-in-the-third-round-of-Iran-s-nuclear-talks.html)

It is also worth pointing out that there are varying interpretations within the P5+1 over whether Iran can spin and conduct research on more advanced centrifuges – this is a key issue in entering the agreement into force. However, this is more of a long-term concern, and will be encountered down the road of the negotiations. The conservative backlash though, has greatly affected the political game of the nation and must be promptly examined.

This week, hardliners executed staged rallies around the country to reinforce their dominance and power, while cooperating with the moderates and other political parties to pressure the P5+1. This week also marked the fourth anniversary of what is perceived in Iran as the conservative party’s victory over the oppositional groups regarding Ahmadinejad’s reelection. People around the country chanted “death to seditionists,” referring to people such as Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi and their political sympathizers. Furthermore, according to local media outlets, the hardliner Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami stated in a speech this week in the city of Kerman: “the seditionists should know that the playing arena is not open to them, and our people are very angry that some seditionists have been given crucial government positions.”

Additionally, in the Majlis (the Iranian parliament), lawmakers have proposed a bill to enrich uranium up to 60 percent, which falls beyond the current level agreed upon between Iran and the P5+1.

## Reid

They concede house gop will vote on it in the mean time – that dooms passage by poisoning the well

Greg Sargent, political writer, 1/14 [“Senate Dems put themselves in tough spot over Iran,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/01/14/senate-dems-put-themselves-in-tough-spot-over-iran/]

On another front, the Wall Street Journal reports that House GOP leaders may bring the Menendez bill to the floor. moving it forward in another chamber. The Huffington Post makes a good point about this, noting that the increasing involvement of House Republicans could make it more likely that Senate Dems come out against it, because it could inject a heavy dose of partisanship into what had been a bipartisan affair**.”¶** Indeed, a plausible case can be made that Republicans want to see the sanctions bill move forward in part because it will exacerbate the already-deepening rift among Democrats over Iran and make it more likely that Obama will have to veto something that passed both houses with large bipartisan majorities. Whatever the motive of Senate Dems who are supporting this bill, they are helping Republicans drive this wedge.